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Abstract: 
Exogenously imposed infinite repetition is known to mitigate people’s uncooperative behaviors 
in dilemma situations with partner matching through personal enforcement. One as yet 
unanswered question is whether people collectively choose to interact with each other under the 
partner matching condition when there exists an alternative possibility under random matching. 
In an indefinitely repeated public goods game framework, I let subjects democratically choose 
whether to (i) play with pre-assigned specific others for all rounds or to (ii) play with randomly 
matched counterparts in every round. The experimental results revealed that most groups 
collectively opt for the partner matching protocol. The data also indicated that groups achieve a 
higher level of cooperation when they democratically select the partner matching protocol by 
voting, relative to when the same option is exogenously imposed. These findings imply that 
people’s equilibrium selection may be affected by how the basic rules of games are introduced 
(endogenously or exogenously). The paper provides further evidence to suggest that the positive 
effect of democratic decision-making is stronger when the majority voting rule, rather than the 
unanimity rule, is applied. 
JEL classification: C92, H41, C73, D72 
Keywords: experiment, public goods, cooperation, dilemma, social norms, endogenous choices 
                                                          
1 This project was supported by a grant-in-aid from the Nakayama Human Science Foundation. I thank John Hey for 
his hospitality when I conducted the experiment at the University of York. I also thank Mark Wilson, an IT manager 
at the University of York, for support in managing the computers and the setup of the z-Tree software in the 
experimental sessions. I thank Pedro Dal Bó, Simon Gächter, and Todd Kaplan, audience of the Behavioural and 
Experimental Northeast Cluster seminar in April 2016 and the Copenhagen Workshop on Endogenous Institutions in 
Social Dilemmas in June 2018 for their comments. I also thank the editor, associate editor and two anonymous 
referees for useful comments that helped substantially improve the paper. 
1 
 
1.  Introduction 
Collective action dilemmas, in which free riding is a strictly dominant strategy but mutual 
cooperation leads to a Pareto optimum, are ubiquitous in our real lives. A rich body of theoretical 
and experimental work has put considerable efforts into exploring how to overcome people’s 
uncooperative behaviors in such dilemma situations. One of the most established behavioral 
findings during the last several decades is that people contribute to public goods to some degree 
even in one-shot games or in earlier rounds of repeated dilemma games (e.g., Ledyard, 1995; 
Chaudhuri, 2011). However, people cannot achieve high levels of cooperation in the absence of 
an institution that facilitates cooperation, such as peer-to-peer monetary or non-monetary 
punishment opportunities (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Masclet, Noussair, Tucker and Villeval, 
2008), because of serious tensions between cooperation and non-cooperation.  
An important finding from research on dilemmas is that a person’s decision to cooperate 
can be significantly altered if the game involves infinite repetition (the possibility to repeatedly 
interact with the same players until an unknown time period in the future). Theoretically, mutual 
cooperation, in addition to mutual defection, holds as an equilibrium outcome with partner 
matching through personal enforcement if the agents are sufficiently patient. Experimental tests 
for the theory of infinitely repeated games can be conducted using indefinitely repeated setups 
with a random continuation rule (Roth and Murnighan, 1978). In previous studies, the evolution 
of cooperation has frequently been tested by using prisoner’s dilemma games. Results from these 
past experiments show that when the partner matching protocol is used, indefinite repetition can 
indeed encourage people to behave more cooperatively under some conditions, compared with 
environments in which players know the precise length of the repeated games and mutual 
defection is the unique equilibrium (e.g., Roth and Murnighan, 1978; Murnighan and Roth, 1983; 
Feinberg and Husted, 1993; Dal Bó, 2005; Duffy and Ochs, 2009; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011).1 
However, not everyone chooses to cooperate in many cases even under indefinite repetition. For 
instance, in Dal Bó (2005) the average cooperation rates range from 20% to 50% across almost 
all treatments even when prisoner’s dilemma games are indefinitely repeated. In Dal Bó and 
Fréchette (2011), cooperation does not evolve even with experience if the mutual cooperation 
                                                          
1 See Dal Bó and Fréchette (2018) for a survey. There are also some experiments that showed that indefinite 
repetition did not increase the level of cooperation compared with in finitely repeated environments (e.g., 
Lugovskyy et al., 2015). 
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outcome is only sub-game perfect but a cooperative action is not risk-dominant. Dal Bó and 
Fréchette (2011) further show that cooperation does not always evolve even when cooperation is 
a risk-dominant equilibrium action.  
One possible channel that may boost cooperation in the partner matching environment is 
a process in which players themselves collectively decide to play with each other under that 
matching protocol. In all the experiments listed above, the partner matching protocol was 
exogenously given to subjects by the experimenters. Democratic decision-making may, however, 
encourage subjects to select a strategy that leads to a high level of cooperation (and accordingly a 
high level of payoff) through signaling effects and the so-called democracy premium. The 
democracy premium is defined as the impact that democratic decision-making directly has on 
people’s preferences and beliefs (excluding any instrumental effects it may have, such as 
selection bias and the effects of information).  
This paper undertakes a two-step approach to study the impact of democracy in the 
context of infinitely repeated games. In the first step, I set up a random matching protocol (where 
people’s interaction partners change from round to round) as an alternative option and then let 
groups select one protocol, partner or random matching. After that I identify the impact of 
democracy. People’s collective choice of a matching protocol is an interesting question in itself, 
not only theoretically but also empirically. From a theoretical perspective, prior work has 
demonstrated that with infinite repetition, community enforcement can sustain cooperation if 
agents are sufficiently patient, even with random matching (e.g., Kandori, 1992; Ellison, 1994). 
Recent experimental literature in this area also shows that indefinite repetition may encourage 
people to cooperate even if no information regarding their interaction partners’ past action 
choices is available.2 Nevertheless, mutual cooperation is theoretically easier to achieve with 
partner matching rather than with random matching, because a higher degree of patience (a higher 
discounting factor) is required for players to choose cooperation in the latter matching protocol. 
One may wonder whether, given a choice, subjects select the partner matching protocol with the 
                                                          
2 Experimental results with random matching are rather mixed and a consensus has not been established yet. While 
Camera and Casari (2009) found a positive impact of indefinite repetition, Duffy and Ochs (2009) and the N 
treatment in Kamei (2017) found no impact. There are also conflicting results from past studies for the impact of 
indefinite repetition when some information on interaction partners is disclosed. While Camera and Casari (2009), 
Stahl (2013) and Kamei (2017) found that cooperation evolved with reputational information, Duffy and Ochs 
(2009) found that it did not do so. 
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aim of obtaining high payoffs through the emergence of strong cooperation norms. From the 
perspective of experimental research, there is also evidence from finitely repeated games to 
suggest that subjects achieve comparatively higher cooperation norms and payoffs under the 
partner matching, because repetition adds strategic incentives to cooperate (see, e.g., Fehr and 
Schurtenberger [2018] for a survey).3,4 Nevertheless, to my knowledge, people’s collective 
choices between the partner and random matching protocols remains hitherto unexplored. This 
paper is the first to study people’s collective choices between the partner versus random matching 
protocol and then to study the consequences of its endogenous adoption of the partner matching 
protocol using a laboratory experiment. 
Examples where people collectively decide whether to form explicit groups (high 
continuation probabilities) or not (low continuation probabilities) are frequently observed, 
especially in small-group interactions. For example, charitable or voluntary groups that aim to 
improve the lives of the poor in a community may form and collectively decide to work together 
for an indefinite amount of time. Other examples include student groups that act for purposes 
such as environment protection, sports and political activities. These student groups are often 
active over an undefined time horizon. Do people prefer to continuously work with the same 
peers, or engage in activities without establishing such groupings? Does a collectively-made 
decision to interact together affect people’s level of cooperation? Further, consider international 
organizations, such as the United Nations. These organizations are formed by countries that 
share a common vision (e.g., poverty alleviation) and the member countries carry out missions 
together to achieve a common goal. The composition of these member countries is fairly stable 
and members thus face a higher continuation probability when making decisions together, 
compared with when they act without being a member of such an organization. Whilst I 
acknowledge that the use of the random matching protocol (an environment with a continuation 
probability of zero in which subjects are randomly assigned to a group and then interact with 
each other only once in each round) as an alternative may not perfectly capture these real-world 
situations, this protocol can approximate a broad range of the settings mentioned above. The 
                                                          
3 Also see Gächter, Kölle and Quercia (2017) who recently showed that subjects’ reputation building motives under 
the partner matching protocol are much larger in the provision (rather than maintenance) of a public good – which is 
the setup of my framework. 
4 Even in a finitely repeated dilemma game, theoretically people can sustain cooperation if a sufficiently large 
fraction of them believe that the peers are acting on non-standard strategies, such as the tit-for-tat strategy (Kreps et 
al., 1982) 
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simplest setup then, with two extreme choice sets (partner versus random matching), enables us 
to parsimoniously capture certain phenomena of theoretical interest. 
Recent studies on endogenous choices of institutions can inform on subjects’ possible 
voting behaviors. The literature, however, provides conflicting evidence and implies different 
behaviors. On the one hand, subjects may vote for the partner matching protocol because votes 
are known to be significantly affected by their material concerns (e.g., Kamei, Tyran and 
Putterman, 2015; Putterman, Tyran and Kamei, 2011). As discussed, subjects’ levels of 
contributions are known to be higher in the partner matching than in the random matching 
protocol. Subjects may also select the partner matching protocol if democratic choice serves as a 
signal that members will cooperate with other group members in the supergame (e.g., Tyran and 
Feld, 2006) because the high incentives to free ride under the random matching protocol are 
sacrificed (e.g., Aimone, Iannaccone and Makowsky, 2013; Grimm and Mengel, 2009). 
Alternatively, voting in favor of playing together may serve as an opportunity to indirectly 
persuade those who initially did not plan to cooperate away from defection (e.g., Cooper, 
DeJong, Forsythe and Ross, 1992; Blume and Ortmann, 2007).5 These voting functions may 
improve cooperation further. Possible democracy premiums may also make partner matching 
more attractive to subjects (e.g., Dal Bó, Forster and Putterman, 2010; Kamei, 2016; Sutter, 
Haigner, Kocher, 2010; Tyran and Feld, 2006).  
On the other hand, Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Eyster (2017) recently demonstrated that voters 
tend to underappreciate equilibrium effects when evaluating alternatives. In my context, voters 
may mistakenly believe that cooperation is still difficult to achieve with partner matching and 
that they may remain stuck in a matching with less-cooperative partners if the partner matching 
protocol is in effect. This misperception may increase the attractiveness of the random matching 
protocol to subjects. Nevertheless, while in Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Eyster (2017) the payoff matrix 
of the stage game differs between the two voting options, I use the same stage game structure for 
the two voting choices and only vary the matching protocols. Thus, arguably less cognitive loads 
would be required to evaluate equilibrium effects in my study than in Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Eyster 
(2017). Subjects may hence quickly learn to select the partner matching protocol. 
                                                          
5 The “hit-and-run” strategy (i.e., defect and then escape from the current group members) is possible with the 
random matching protocol. 
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In addition to the contribution to the literature on democratic choices, this study also 
contributes to the research agenda on endogenous group formation and partner choice. 
Cooperation is known to be more likely to evolve in dilemma games with fixed group size, if 
individuals are provided with both an ability to choose with whom they interact and sufficient 
information on other players’ past behaviors (e.g., Coricelli, Fehr and Fellner, 2004; Page, 
Putterman and Unel, 2005; Kamei and Putterman, 2017). The evolution of cooperation is also 
likely to be seen in dilemma games with variable group size (by voting with your feet) when 
entry to a new group requires the group members’ agreement (e.g., Ahn, Isaac and Salmon, 
2008; Charness and Yang, 2014), or when peer-to-peer sanctioning institutions are present (e.g., 
Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach, 2006; Nicklisch, Grechenig and Thöni, 2016; Fehr and 
Williams, 2018). None of these studies, however, focused on identifying the impact of 
democracy. Instead, they examined other factors, such as the beneficial effects of competition for 
trustworthy partners and subjects’ reputation building behaviors. In contrast, the direct effect of 
democracy in selecting to play with fixed partners may itself partly account for the positive 
evidence. 
I use a linear public goods game framework (also known as voluntary contribution 
mechanism). In groups of four, each subject is given a fixed endowment and decides 
simultaneously how much to contribute to their group in every round. I design three treatments: 
one for the control condition and the other two for the treatment conditions. The three treatments 
are identical, except for the implementation process of the matching protocols. In the control 
condition, subjects play the public good game indefinitely with three fixed individuals and no 
agreement procedure is available. By contrast, in the treatment conditions, subjects are randomly 
assigned to groups with three individuals at the onset, and then each group democratically 
decides whether they want to play the public goods game with each other (i) for all rounds 
subject to a random continuation rule or (ii) for one round only. Option (i) is a standard partner 
matching condition, whereas option (ii) is a standard random matching condition. If a group 
selects option (ii), the group is dissolved after the one-time interaction. In the following round, 
subjects will be randomly re-matched with three individuals from groups that selected option (ii), 
and play the one-shot public goods game. This process – dissolution, random matching and one-
shot public goods game – continues with a fixed probability (the random continuation rule). 
Experimental parameters are set so that (a) contributing nothing for the group is a strictly 
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dominant strategy if the stage game is played just once but (b) if the stage game is infinitely 
repeated it becomes a coordination game (where any symmetric, positive contribution situation is 
sustained as an equilibrium outcome). The two treatment conditions differ by voting rule: 
unanimity rule or majority rule. Under the unanimity rule, subjects repeat voting until they reach 
a consensus. Agreement procedures in some real interactions use unanimity rules (including the 
small-group interactions mentioned in the above examples, and various decisions made by 
international organizations such as the United Nations and by political unions such as the 
European Union). Some past experimental studies on the impact of democratic decision-making 
have modeled democratic processes by using similar unanimity rules, including Sutter, Haigner 
and Kocher (2010). Under the majority rule, subjects cast votes once, and whichever protocol 
that receives at least three votes is implemented in a group. A majority rule is also widely used 
form of democratic decision-making and is also adopted in past experiments on democracy, 
including Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010), Tyran and Feld (2006) and Kamei (2016). As all 
the design aspects except the voting rule are identical for the three treatments, I can also provide 
new evidence about the difference in the impact of democracy between the two voting rules.  
The experiment reveals that, first, almost all groups choose the partner matching protocol 
by voting. This is consistent with the theory that sustaining a high level of cooperation is easier 
in the partner matching than in the random matching protocol. Second, regardless of whether the 
unanimity or majority rule is used, subjects contribute significantly more in the treatment 
conditions, compared with subjects in the control condition, where the same partner matching 
protocol is exogenously imposed on them. A detailed analysis suggests that the positive effect of 
voting is not due to selection effects (e.g., Tyran and Feld, 2006; Dal Bó, Forster and Putterman, 
2010; Dal Bó, Forster and Kamei, 2015) but can be partly explained by higher beliefs formed by 
subjects in the treatment conditions, consistent with the idea of the signaling hypothesis (e.g., 
Tyran and Feld, 2006) or of democracy premiums. This result implies that democratic decision-
making may significantly affect subjects’ equilibrium selection in an infinitely repeated public 
goods game by influencing their beliefs. Yet there is an interesting difference between the two 
voting rules: the impact of democracy is stronger when the majority, rather than the unanimity, 
rule is used. The strong impact of democracy persists within supergames under the majority rule, 
whereas the effect diminishes from round to round within supergames under the unanimity rule. 
There is also a clear sign of democracy premium on subjects’ contribution behaviors under the 
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majority rule: we observe positive impact on subjects’ decision to contribute even after 
controlling for their beliefs. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design. 
Section 3 briefly provides theoretical considerations. Section 4 reports results, and Section 5 
concludes. 
2.  Experimental Design 
The design frame is an indefinitely repeated public goods game. The group size is four. 
Subjects play the indefinitely repeated game five times in each treatment.6 The repeated 
supergame design was chosen, instead of a one-shot supergame design, to explore how people’s 
collective choices change from supergame to supergame and how the impact of democracy 
persists over time. I employ a standard random matching protocol across the supergames, i.e., at 
the onset of each supergame group compositions are randomly changed. The duration of each 
supergame is stochastically determined. I set the random continuation probability as 75% (e.g., 
Dal Bó, 2005): subjects in the tth round of a given supergame will play the next round (i.e., round 
t + 1) with a probability of 75% (the supergame ends with a probability of 25%). The expected 
length of subjects’ interactions is therefore 4 (= 1/(1 – 0.75)) rounds in each supergame. This 
feature of stochastic determination of the game duration is common knowledge to all subjects.  
The experiment consists of two endogenous treatments, denoted as the “Endogenous, 
Unanimity” (ENDO-U) and “Endogenous, Majority” (ENDO-M) treatments, and one exogenous 
treatment, denoted as the “Exogenous” (EXO) treatment (Table 1).  I adopt a between-subjects 
design, rather than a within-subjects design, because democratic decision-making may affect 
subjects’ behaviors beyond the environment where subjects make decisions. This indirect effect 
of democratic decision-making is defined as the spill-over effect of democracy in Kamei (2016). 
Thus, we obtain cleaner data if we divide subjects into independent treatment and control groups 
and then let them play the game under only one condition than otherwise. 
This paper’s empirical strategies to identify the impact of democratic decision-making 
are as follows:  
 
                                                          
6 The term “phase” was used in the experiment to refer to indefinitely repeated game. 
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Strategy a: to compare subjects’ action choices in the 1st supergame between two treatments but 
use only the rounds that occurred in all sessions of the 1st supergame in the two treatments. 
Strategy b: to compare subjects’ action choices in all supergames between the two treatments 
but use only the rounds that occurred in all sessions in the two treatments.  
 
The strategies to compare subjects’ behaviors in the common rounds between two treatments are 
employed because each supergame likely has a different length by session due to the random 
continuation rule. The data would not be comparable between sessions (and accordingly between 
the two treatments) if we use the complete dataset. With strategies a and b, we most likely use 
the first round of each supergame to study the impact of democracy. Since I use the continuation 
probability of 75%, the probability that at least two rounds occur in all sessions of two treatments 
for a comparison is: (0.75)K  100[%], where K is the number of sessions. As will be explained 
in Section 4, there are three sessions per treatment. Thus, K = 6. Hence, the probability that at 
least two rounds are realized in all the sessions in the ENDO-U and EXO treatments, or in the 
ENDO-M and EXO treatments, is very low – only 17.8% (= (0.75)6  100). 
I perform analyses using strategy a, in addition to using strategy b, because data in the 
first supergame is cleaner than that of the 2nd to 5th supergames. Subjects’ experiences in the first 
supergame would differ by session due to the random continuation rule. The difference in 
subjects’ experiences in earlier supergames may affect their contribution and voting behaviors in 
the later supergames. I now explain each design aspect one by one. 
2.1. The Stage Game 
 The stage game used in the experiment is a linear public goods game. In every round, 
subjects are each given an endowment of 20 points, and they simultaneously decide how to 
allocate it between their private and public accounts. The contribution amount must be an integer 
between 0 and 20. The sum of allocations to the private account and the public account must be 
20 points. For each point that a subject allocates to her private account, she obtains one point as 
her payoff without affecting the payoffs of her group members. For each point she allocates to 
her public account, she and her three partners each obtain Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) = 
0.4 points as payoffs. In summary, when subject i contributes Ci,t to the public account in round 
t, she obtains the following payoff: 
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 20 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑟 ∑ 𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 , (1) 
where r = 0.4 (MPCR) and N = 4 in this study. Note that 1/N < r < 1. 
2.2. The Treatment Conditions 
 In the ENDO-U treatment, after subjects are randomly assigned to a group of four in each 
supergame, they select a matching protocol by voting (Figure 1(a)). The voting option is either 
partner matching (a continuation probability of 0.75) or random matching (a continuation 
probability of 0.00).7 The collective decision is made by a unanimity rule: four members of a 
group continue to vote until all members vote for the same option. The maximum number of the 
voting stages is 20.8 In the case that the four members do not agree on one option in the 20th 
voting stage, a majority rule is applied to determine the group’s choice.9 
 In the ENDO-M treatment, subjects vote only once between the two matching protocols 
in each supergame. Whichever protocol receives at least three votes is implemented in the group. 
In case of a tie, the computer selects one of the two protocols with a probability of 50% in that 
group. 
If a group selects the partner matching protocol, then the four subjects interact with each 
other until the end of a given supergame. By contrast, if the group selects the random matching 
protocol, their interaction is one-shot. All groups that selected the random matching protocol are 
dissolved after the one-shot interaction. They are then randomly assigned to new groups of four 
among them and play the game with the three new peers once. The process of dissolution, random 
re-matching and one-shot public goods game repeats with a continuation probability of 75%.10  
                                                          
7 The two options were called “all periods in a given phase” and “one period” in the experiment. 
8 The maximum number of voting stages is set in order to avoid the duration of the experiment being too long.  
9 When votes are split equally between the two options in the 20th vote, one of them is randomly (i.e., with a 
probability of 50%) selected by the computer.  
10 If the number of groups that selected the random matching protocol is only one, then the four group members 
interact with each other for all rounds in the given supergame because there are no other groups to be dissolved. As 
an anonymous referee pointed out, this design aspect could affect subjects’ behaviors if they realize that the number 
of groups that selected the random matching is sufficiently small because then the random matching becomes almost 
equivalent to the partner matching. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this concern biased subjects’ decisions in the 
experiment for the following two reasons. First, as will be explained in Section 4.1, most groups selected the partner 
matching protocol from the first supergame. Second, subjects were not informed how many groups selected the 
random matching protocol. As shown in Section 4.2, subjects’ contribution behaviors were significantly different 
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2.3. The Control Condition 
In the EXO treatment, subjects have no opportunity to select a matching protocol. 
Instead, subjects are instructed that they will play with three pre-assigned members under partner 
matching in a given supergame (Figure 1(b)).11   
2.4. Elicitation of Beliefs 
 As an additional analysis, I elicit subjects’ beliefs in order to examine the motivation 
behind subjects’ decisions to contribute.12 Specifically, in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M 
treatments, after the voting stage and before moving on to the sequence of allocation stages, all 
subjects are asked about beliefs on the average contribution amount to the public account by 
their interaction peers during a given supergame. Likewise, subjects in the EXO treatment are 
also asked to state their beliefs on their interaction peers’ average contribution amount before 
each supergame commences.  
I note that the belief elicitation task is not incentivized in order to minimize its effects on 
subjects’ action choices because this paper’s first priority is on subjects’ voting and their actual 
contribution behaviors.13 Possible side effects of incentivized belief elicitation methods have 
been documented (see, for example, Gächter and Renner [2010] for the detail).14  
                                                          
between the partner and random matching protocols. This suggests that subjects would likely have perceived the 
random matching protocol as different from the partner matching protocol. 
11 I acknowledge that there are other ways to design the control treatment. For instance, another possible way would 
be to assign each matching protocol stochastically to control groups with the actual percentages of groups which 
selected each option in the ENDO-U or ENDO-M treatment, without informing subjects of the percentages of 
stochastic implementation. I did not employ this method because subjects in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments 
were able to guess the likelihood of these matching protocols being selected to some degree as their votes determine 
collective choices. Alternatively, we could stochastically impose one of the two matching protocols on control 
groups while notifying subjects the percentages of stochastic determination. However, this control treatment design 
is not perfect either considering that subjects in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments are not given the information 
as to how many groups select the partner or random matching protocol. 
12 The importance of beliefs when subjects choose actions has been experimentally demonstrated in finitely repeated 
setups (e.g., Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Kamei and Putterman, 2017). 
13 See Sections (d) and (e) in Appendix A for computer screen images for this elicitation task. 
14 Gächter and Renner (2010) let subjects play a finitely repeated linear public goods game with the same 
experimental parameters as this paper (the per-subject endowment is 20 points and the MPCR is 0.4). Their results 
indicated that although elicited beliefs were more accurate when they were incentivized than when they were not 
incentivized, the mean difference was only 0.59 points, and that the incentivized elicitation significantly influenced 
subjects’ decision to contribute. If subjects’ beliefs were not incentivized, by contrast, their contribution amounts 
were not significantly different from those in a treatment where beliefs were not elicited. Gächter and Renner (2010) 
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3. Theoretical Considerations on Subjects’ Behaviors 
 The standard theory does not provide a point prediction in the experiment. In the EXO 
treatment, not only the mutual free-riding but also any symmetric, positive contribution situation 
holds as an equilibrium outcome since I adopt 0.75 as a continuation probability. To illustrate a 
possibility of the mutual full contribution equilibrium in this control treatment, suppose that all 
four individuals in a group have contributed the full endowment amounts (E) to the public 
account before round t and have been and will be using a grim trigger strategy. That is, a subject 
i contributes E points until she sees at least one instance of defection where one of the 
individuals in her group contributes less than E; once i faces the defection she starts contributing 
zero points until the end of a given supergame. In this situation, if subject i continues to follow 
the grim trigger strategy in and after round t, her expected payoff (𝐸[𝜋𝑖]) is calculated as: 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖]
cooperate = ∑ 𝛿𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑠(𝑐𝑖,𝑠)
∞
𝑠=𝑡 =
𝑟∙𝑁∙𝐸
1−𝛿
= 128, (2) 
where E = 20, r is the MPCR (= 0.4), N is group size (= 4) and 𝛿 is the continuation probability 
(= 0.75). Alternatively, if she changes her strategy and contributes zero points in round t, her 
expected payoff is maximized by also contributing zero points in any round after round t because 
the other three players will contribute zeros as they are following the grim trigger strategy. The 
maximum payoff is thus calculated as: 
𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖]
defect = 𝐸 − 0 + 𝑟 ∙ (𝑁 − 1) ∙ 𝐸 + ∑ 𝛿𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑠(𝑐𝑖,𝑠)
∞
𝑠=𝑡+1 = 44 +
𝛿∙𝐸
1−𝛿
= 104, (3) 
which is less than the mutual full contribution payoff in Eq. (2). It is therefore not materially 
beneficial for i to deviate from the mutual full contribution situation. Note that the threshold 
value of δ so that the mutual full contribution situation can be supported as an equilibrium 
outcome is 0.5, which is much less than 0.75.  
 There also exists a symmetric, positive, but less-than-full-contribution equilibrium for 
any contribution level ξ ∊ {1, 2, …, E} in the EXO treatment. The existence of such an 
equilibrium can be checked with the same logic that assumes the subjects’ grim trigger strategy. 
                                                          
suggest that “If the researcher is afraid that belief elicitation leads to behavioral results that he or she would not 
obtain when not asking for beliefs, then […] belief elicitation should not be incentivized” (page 372). 
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With the symmetric contribution equilibrium with the contribution level of ξ points, subject i 
obtains a payoff as in Eq. (4): 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖]
continue to contribute ξ points = ∑ 𝛿𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑠(𝜉)
∞
𝑠=𝑡 =
𝐸−𝜉+𝑟∙𝑁∙𝜉
1−𝛿
. (4) 
If subject i, by contrast, contributes zero points to the public account in a given round, she 
obtains the following as maximum payoff: 
𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖]
defect = 𝐸 − 0 + 𝑟 ∙ (𝑁 − 1) ∙ 𝜉 + ∑ 𝛿𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑠(0)
∞
𝑠=𝑡+1 . 
 = 𝐸 + 𝑟 ∙ (𝑁 − 1)𝜉 +
𝛿𝐸
1−𝛿
. (5) 
Eqs. (4) and (5) suggest that 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖]
continue to contribute ξ points > 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖]
defect, regardless of the 
value of 𝜉, if δ > 0.5.15 We also see that Eq. (4) is monotonically increasing in the symmetric 
contribution level ξ. In other words, the strategic situation that subjects face is the one with 
Pareto-ranked multiple equilibria. 
The same holds true also for groups that select the partner matching protocol in the 
ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments. These groups face the same strategic situation with Pareto-
ranked multiple equilibria. 
 
Summary 1: Not only the mutual full free-riding situation, but also any symmetric, positive 
contribution situation holds as an equilibrium outcome in the EXO treatment. Subjects in groups 
that implemented the partner matching protocol in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments face 
the same strategic situation as the subjects in the EXO treatment.  
 
 Subjects have stronger incentives to defect in groups where the random matching 
protocol is implemented because they can hit and run, considering that the respective groups will 
be dissolved after a given round and they may be matched with subjects from other groups in the 
following rounds. Following the logic of Kandori (1992), however, one instance of defection can 
spread very quickly to other subjects in groups with the random matching protocol if each 
subject employs a grim trigger strategy. Due to this contagion process, the symmetric, positive 
contribution situation with any level ξ ∊ {1, 2, …, E}, including the mutual full contribution 
situation, can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. Incentives to defect depend on how many 
groups selected the random matching protocol. Taking an extreme example to illustrate, suppose 
                                                          
15 The threshold δ is decreasing in the size of N and also in the size of r. 
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that there are 24 subjects in the experiment and that all of the six groups selected the random 
matching protocol. As will be explained later, the number of groups per session was either five 
or six in the experiment. Because the incentive to defect is largest in this extreme situation, if the 
symmetric positive contribution situations can be supported as equilibrium outcomes in this 
situation, there is clearly no incentive for subject i to deviate from the grim trigger strategy when 
the number of groups that selected the random matching protocol is less than six. As calculated 
in Appendix B, even in this extreme situation, when subject i contributes less than ξ points in 
round t, the percentage of full free-riders out of the other 23 subjects reaches around 90% by 
round t + 3, even if the 23 subjects have contributed ξ points until round t. Due to the rapid 
contagion of free-riding, the total expected payoff from defection is lower than the mutual 
cooperation payoff, which is (E – ξ + r∙N∙ξ)/(1 – δ). This means that i has no incentive to deviate 
and thus any symmetric contribution situation holds as an equilibrium outcome. These 
considerations are summarized as follows: 
 
Summary 2: Regardless of how many groups select the random matching protocol, both mutual 
full free-riding situation and any symmetric, positive contribution situation (including the mutual 
full contribution situation) hold as equilibrium outcomes when the random matching protocol is 
implemented in a given supergame.  
 
 Despite the theoretical analyses contained in Summary 1 and Summary 2, we would 
expect that the symmetric contribution equilibrium for a given contribution level (ξ points) is 
more easily attained when the partner matching protocol, rather than the random matching 
protocol, is selected. This is because, with random matching, the threshold value of continuation 
probabilities above which the mutual contribution holds as an equilibrium outcome (𝛿̅random) is 
greater than or equal to that with partner matching (𝛿̅partner = .5). Recall that group composition 
changes in every round among those who selected the random matching protocol. 𝛿̅random would 
coincide with 𝛿̅partner in the (somewhat unlikely) case that only one group selects the random 
matching protocol and the members of this specific group are aware of the fact that they are the 
only group that selected that matching protocol; in any other situation, 𝛿̅random is always greater 
than 𝛿̅partner. This suggests that subjects’ incentives to deviate are smaller with partner matching 
than in the random matching protocol. We can therefore summarize the difference in subjects’ 
contribution behavior as follows: 
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Summary 3: Any given symmetric contribution situation is more easily attained in the partner 
matching than in the random matching protocol. 
 
 Summary 3 suggests that the average contribution in groups that select the partner 
matching protocol would be higher than that in groups that select the random matching protocol.  
As already discussed in Section 1, we cannot provide definite predictions as to which of 
the two matching protocols groups select, although a larger fraction of studies seems to suggest 
that more groups would select the partner matching protocol.  
I also note that, notwithstanding Summary 1, subjects’ contribution behavior under the 
partner matching protocol may be stronger in the ENDO-M and ENDO-U treatments than in the 
EXO treatment, because voting for the partner matching protocol may serve as a signal that the 
subject wishes to forgo the high temptation to deviate under random matching (Aimone, 
Iannaccone and Makowsky, 2013),16 and thus as a signal of their future contribution behavior 
(e.g. Tyran and Feld, 2006). The democracy premium may also be present when groups 
collectively implement the partner matching protocol (Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman, 2010; 
Kamei, 2016; Markussen, Putterman and Tyran, 2014; Sutter, Haigner, Kocher, 2010; Tyran and 
Feld, 2006).17 If the signaling effects and/or the democracy premium are significant, then, for 
example, beliefs about others’ contributions formed by subjects under the partner matching 
protocol might be higher in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments than in the EXO treatment. 
The positive effect of the democracy premium may even be compounded if democracy directly 
affects subjects’ cooperation behaviors through a channel other than beliefs (e.g., Kamei, 2016). 
4. Results 
 The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Experimental Economics (EXEC) 
laboratory at the University of York in the United Kingdom from October to December 2015 and 
October 2016.18 All subjects were students at the University of York. In total, nine sessions – 
three for each treatment, were conducted. Each session consisted of five or six groups (20 or 24 
                                                          
16 See Grimm and Mengel (2009) and Frédéric and Weber (2013) also. 
17 The presence of the democracy premium may depend on the distribution of income. All the papers cited here used 
setups where endowments were the same among subjects. The democracy premium was not observed in Kamei 
(2018), where subjects democratically selected a public goods game or a lottery contest when endowments were 
unequally distributed among the subjects.  
18 I first conducted the ENDO-U and EXO treatments in 2015. I then conducted the ENDO-M treatment as the 
second experiment in October 2016. 
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subjects). Subjects voluntarily registered for and participated in the experiment. They were 
recruited by solicitation messages sent through hroot (Bock, Nicklisch, and Baetge, 2014). No 
subject participated in more than one session. Client computers were separated from each other 
by three sufficiently tall partitions (one for the front and two for the sides). No communication 
was permitted throughout the experiment. 
All experimental procedures except the instructions and comprehension questions were 
computerized. They were programmed in the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). All 
instructions were neutrally framed (see Appendix A). Any words with positive or negative 
connotation (e.g., contribute, public goods) were avoided. At the onset of the experiment, the 
instructions were handed out to subjects and read aloud by the researcher. Subjects were then 
asked to answer comprehension questions to check their understanding of the experiment. At the 
end of the experiment, each subject was privately paid based on their interaction outcomes. The 
average per-subject payoff (including £3 for show-up fee) was 15.85 pounds sterling. 
4.1. Subjects’ Voting Behavior 
 I first examine subjects’ vote outcomes in order to address the first research question 
(people’s collective choice). First, the experimental results showed that most groups 
implemented the partner matching protocol from the first supergame (Table 1). Specifically, 15 
out of 16 groups in each of the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments chose to play with the pre-
assigned players for the full set of rounds in the first supergame. The percentages of groups that 
chose this option remained similar during the five supergames in the ENDO-U treatment, except 
for the 3rd supergame in which the percentage was slightly lower.19 The number of these groups 
declined slightly after the first supergame in the ENDO-M treatment, but the numbers hovered at 
high levels between ten and 13 groups during the 2nd to 5th supergames. The difference in the 
                                                          
19 As an anonymous referee pointed out, some readers may think that if subjects experienced a large number of 
voting stages due to disagreement and ended up by selecting the partner matching protocol in a given supergame, in 
a later supergame the partner matching protocol might become a focal point and subjects may just vote for it quickly 
to avoid a lengthy voting process. Or worse, there may even emerge an experimenter demand effect that encourages 
subjects to vote for the partner matching protocol. There is no evidence in the data, however, to support this pattern 
(see Part I of Appendix Table C.1). The average numbers of voting stages required to reach a consensus were 3.31, 
3.13, 4.56, 5.63, and 6.13 in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th supergames, respectively. The numbers of groups that reached 
a consensus in the very first voting stage were 5, 6, 3, 5, and 4 in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th supergames, respectively. 
16 
 
fraction of groups that selected the partner matching protocol is not significantly different 
between the two endogenous treatments in each supergame.20 
 Second, although we found overwhelming support for the partner matching protocol, the 
number of voting stages required for groups to agree on one of the two matching protocols 
differed substantially by group and session in the ENDO-U treatment (Part I in Appendix Table 
C.1). While 28.8% and 25.0% of groups reached unanimous agreement in the first and second 
voting stages, respectively, 32.5% of group decisions required at least five voting stages. 
Similarly, the number of supports for the partner matching protocol differs by groups under the 
majority rule (Part II in Appendix Table C.1). 23.8% of groups had all four members’ supports, 
while 46.3% and 25.0% of groups had three and two members’ supports, respectively, in the 
ENDO-M treatment (the remaining 5% of groups had one support for the partner matching and 
instead implemented the random matching protocol). 
 
Result 1: (i) Most groups implemented the partner matching protocol in each supergame. (ii) 
Nevertheless, there was substantial variation across groups in the number of voting stages 
required to agree on the partner matching protocol in the ENDO-U treatment and the number of 
supports for that protocol in the ENDO-M treatment. 
 
4.2. The Impact of Democracy 
I now move on to identify the impact of democratic decision-making on subjects’ 
contribution behaviors.21 We usually need to take care of selection effects for this purpose (e.g., 
Tyran and Feld, 2006; Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman, 2010; Dal Bó, Foster and Kamei, 2015). 
The collective preference exhibited by almost all groups to commit to a longer partnership from 
the 1st supergame (Result 1(i)), however, means that no subsample unrepresentative of the 
population emerges from the voting process in the ENDO-U or ENDO-M treatment. This 
observation suggests that there is little concern of selection bias in the data, although I conducted 
                                                          
20 p-values based on two-sided Fisher’s exact tests for the null that the fractions are equal for the two treatments are 
1.000, .600, .685, .220, and .333 in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th supergames, respectively. 
21 Because average payoffs are the linear transformations of subjects’ average contribution amounts based on Eq. 
(1), results are the same even if payoff data are used instead.  
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some robustness checks nevertheless as explained later in this subsection.22 By contrast, it may 
be desirable to control for the possibility of correlated subject choices within sessions especially 
for the ENDO-U treatment since the duration of voting stages differed by session (Section 4.1). 
To address this possibility, I cluster standard errors at the session level when analyzing 
individual-level data. 
 My method to identify the impact of democracy is to use the empirical strategies a and b 
discussed in Section 2. As expected, in each supergame, only the first round was the common 
period that occurred for all the six sessions in the ENDO-U and the EXO treatments.23 The same 
holds also for the six sessions in the ENDO-M and EXO treatments. Hence, I use round 1 
behaviors in each supergame to compare contribution decisions between the ENDO-U and EXO 
treatments, and between the ENDO-M and EXO treatments.  
Table 2 summarizes the average round 1 contribution amount by session, matching 
protocol and supergame. The average contribution in the 1st supergame is 10.97 points in the 
ENDO-U treatment when the groups selected the partner matching protocol. This is greater than 
the average contribution in the EXO treatment (9.19 points). The large difference in the average 
contribution between the two treatments persists until the 5th supergame.  The average 
contribution under the partner matching is even higher in the ENDO-M treatment – 12.47 points 
in the first supergame and 10.27 points on average across the five supergames. The average 
contributions in the ENDO-M treatment are 35.7%, 30.4%, 25.4%, 36.6%, and 34.8% higher 
than those in the EXO treatment in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th supergames, respectively.  
In order to ascertain the statistical significance of the impact of democracy, I conducted a 
regression analysis. Columns (1) and (4), and columns (2) and (5) of Table 3 report the 
estimation results when using data of the 1st supergame only (1st SG data, hereafter) and of all the 
five supergames (All SG data, hereafter), respectively. The dependent variable is subject i’s 
contribution amount to the public account in round 1. Only observations in groups which 
                                                          
22 Controlling for selection bias is required if a selection through voting occurs unlike Result 1(i). See Dal Bó, Foster 
and Putterman (2010) and Tyran and Feld (2006). Also see Dal Bó, Foster and Kamei (2015), who recently propose 
a new identification strategy for correcting selection bias in the case of majority voting.  
23 The trends of subjects’ round-by-round action choices by supergame and by session are provided in Appendix 
Figure C.1. As anticipated, the realized length of each indefinitely repeated game differed by session and supergame 
as often seen in indefinitely repeated game experiments. For instance, the 1st supergame lasted for only one round in 
three out of the nine sessions conducted in this study.  
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operated under the partner matching protocol were used. The independent variables include the 
Endo dummy variable, which equals 1 for the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments; and 0 for the 
EXO treatment. A tobit regression model is used for the estimation because subjects’ 
contribution amounts are censored at 0 and 20.24 Standard errors are clustered by session for all 
the specifications.25 The specification in columns (1) and (4) includes only the Endo dummy, 
while in columns (2) and (5), the supergame number variable (which equals 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) is 
also included to control for the trend across the supergames. Further, in columns (2) and (5), the 
interaction term between the supergame number variable and the Endo dummy is included as the 
across-supergame trend may differ by the treatment. Three clear patterns were found. First, 
letting subjects collectively choose the partner matching protocol helps enhance subjects’ 
contributions significantly in the first supergame, regardless of the voting rule used (see columns 
(1) and (4)). Second, the across-supergame trends in contributions are not different between the 
ENDO-U or ENDO-M treatment and the EXO treatment, and the positive effect of democratic 
decision-making persists across the supergames, regardless of the voting rule used (see columns 
(2) and (5)).26 Third, the positive impact of democracy is stronger when the majority rule, rather 
than the unanimity rule, is used (see the coefficient estimates of the Endo dummy).27    
 Subjects’ contribution amounts were very different between groups that selected the 
partner matching protocol and those that selected the random matching protocol. The average 
                                                          
24 One drawback of using a tobit model is that there is no theoretically valid way to add individual random effects on 
top of session clustering. An alternative method to address this concern is to adopt an ordered probit regression 
model because subjects’ choice set (contribution amount) is ordered: {0, 1, 2, …, 20}. The ordered probit method 
allows researchers to include both clustering and individual random effects. I estimated the same specifications 
using individual random effects ordered probit regression with standard errors clustered by session ID as a 
robustness check. The results, found in Appendix Table C.2, are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3. As a 
further robustness check, I also ran a linear regression while including both session clustering and individual random 
effects, which again finds results qualitatively similar to those of Table 3 (the results are omitted to conserve space). 
25 Clustering by session is especially required for the All SG data because the random matching protocol is used for 
matching across the supergames. 
26 Results are similar when two-sided session average Mann-Whitney tests are used. The average round 1 
contribution in the 1st supergame under the partner matching protocol is significantly higher in the ENDO-U or 
ENDO-M treatment than in the EXO treatment (p = .0495). The difference in the average contribution amount is 
also statistically significant between the endogenous and exogenous treatments when we use average round 1 
contributions across all of the five supergames (p = .0495). 
27 The difference in the coefficient estimate of the Endo dummy between columns (1) and (4) is significant (p 
= .0020, two-sided F test), although the difference between columns (2) and (5) is not significant (p = .1787, two-
sided F test). 
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contribution for the latter was significantly lower than for the former (Table 2).28 This finding is 
consistent with Summary 3.29 
 
Result 2: (i) Regardless of which voting rule was used, subjects contributed significantly more 
when they democratically implemented the partner matching protocol, compared with when they 
were exogenously given the same matching protocol. This difference remained similar from the 
first to the last supergame. (ii) The impact of democracy is stronger under the majority rule than 
under the unanimity rule. (iii) Subjects contributed significantly more in the partner matching 
than in the random matching protocol. 
 
 These results are robust even if we consider the possibility of small selection effects. For 
instance, as discussed with Table 1, one group selected the random matching protocol in the 1st 
supergame in each of the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments. One might assume that the least 
cooperative groups selected the random matching protocol and thus the effect of democracy seen 
in Tables 2 and 3 may be overestimated. As a robustness check, I conducted two further 
regressions with specifications the same as those in columns (1) and (4) of Table 3, while 
excluding one group with the lowest contribution amount in the EXO treatment. As shown in 
Appendix Table C.4, it was found that the Endo dummy variable has a significantly positive 
coefficient as in columns (1) and (4) of Table 3. I likewise conducted a robustness check for the 
results of columns (2) and (5) by dropping groups with the lowest contribution amounts in other 
supergames of the EXO treatment and found that the Endo dummy still obtains a significant 
coefficient (the details are included in Appendix Table C.4).  
 
Result 2: (iv) Results 2(i) and (ii) are not due to possible selection effects.  
 
                                                          
28 We compared the average contributions between the two matching protocols using data from all supergames 
considering Result 1(i). Tobit regressions with standard errors clustered by session ID find that the differences are 
significant at p = .017 (p = .041) and p = .065 (p = .002) when only data in round 1 (data in all rounds) are used in 
the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments, respectively. Recall that most groups selected the partner matching protocol. 
Although we cannot rule out the effect of selection bias, this estimation result suggests that subjects who selected 
random matching may have believed that more than one group selected that matching option and have acted 
differently from under the partner matching protocol. 
29 As an anonymous referee pointed out, another possible experimental design could be to let subjects play the game 
under the partner matching or random matching before making a voting decision, because some subjects may not 
appreciate beforehand the beneficial effects of having fixed partners. Result 1(i), however, implies that such 
experiences are not necessary for subjects to select the partner matching protocol. 
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As shown in Part I of Appendix Table C.1, some groups did not unanimously agree on 
one of the two protocols even in the last voting stage (i.e., the 20th voting stage). Results in Table 
3 change little even if we exclude these groups from regressions in the ENDO-U treatment (see 
Appendix Table C.3 for the estimation results). 
 A question not answered so far by relying on empirical strategies a and b is how the 
impact of democracy transits within the supergames. One advantage of the experimental design 
was that subjects interact repeatedly within supergames. This design feature may enable us to 
address this additional question. Although not all groups played more than one round in each 
supergame, on average over half of groups did go through three rounds within supergames.30 
Specifically, on average 78.4%, 64.7%, 48.2%, and only 30.3% of groups reached round 2, 
round 3, round 4 and round 5, respectively, as outcomes of random draws in the continuation 
rule. Hence, I study the persistence of the impact of democracy using data from the first three 
rounds within supergames.31  
I employ a method to perform a regression analysis as in Table 3 with the same 
specifications just studied based on strategies a and b, except that the Rounds within supergames 
variable and its interaction with the Endo dummy are additionally included as independent 
variables (columns (3) and (6) of Table 3). First, the estimation results show that the Rounds 
within supergames variable has a significantly negative coefficient. This is natural because an 
instance of defection usually spreads across the group over time as some subjects act according 
to conditional cooperation or punishment strategies in infinitely repeated game interactions (e.g., 
Camera and Casari, 2009; Kamei, 2017). Note that subjects must withhold cooperation in my 
design to punish uncooperative partners because they do not have another punishment stage. 
Second, and more importantly, the additional interaction term has a significantly negative 
coefficient when the unanimity rule is used, whereas it does not when the majority rule is used. 
This suggests that the premium from endogenous adoption of partner matching diminishes from 
                                                          
30 We cannot compare within-supergame trends between the ENDO-U or ENDO-M treatment and the EXO 
treatment by only using the data from the first supergame, because in the EXO treatment the supergame lengths 
were one round for two sessions and two rounds for the other session in that supergame. 
31 Although the number of observations increases if we use data up to round 4, we then require greater reliance on a 
subset of groups (on average a little over 50% of groups did not reach round 4). Nevertheless we note that results I 
will present now little change even when we use data up to round 4 within supergames. 
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round to round under the unanimity rule, but it persists over the rounds under the majority rule. 
This result strengthens Result 2(ii). 
 
Result 3: Despite Result 2(i), the within-supergame trend for the impact of democracy differs by 
voting rule. Specifically, the positive impact persists over rounds under the majority rule, but 
diminishes from round to round under the unanimity rule in a given supergame.  
 
4.3. Subjects’ Beliefs on their Peers’ Action Choices 
 A possible underlying factor that may be driving Result 2 is the effect of democratic 
decision-making on enhancing beliefs as to peers’ cooperation behaviors. This effect stems from 
two potential sources: the effect of voting as an indirect signal of cooperation (e.g., Tyran and 
Feld 2006) and the direct effect that democracy has on people’s beliefs (a democracy premium).  
I first studied how subjects’ beliefs evolved from supergame to supergame (Table 4). The 
average beliefs in the 1st supergame formed by subjects who implemented the partner matching 
protocol in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments were higher than those formed by subjects 
who were exogenously given the same protocol in the EXO treatment. The differences are 
significant (see columns (1) and (3) in Table 5 and Table C.5). This is suggestive of the idea that 
democratic decision-making positively affects people’s beliefs.32 On the other hand, average 
beliefs under the partner matching protocol in the ENDO-U treatment declined rapidly from 
supergame to supergame, and settled at a similar level to the EXO treatment in the 3rd to 5th 
supergames (see again Table 4). A regression analysis indicates that the average beliefs across all 
supergames are at most weakly significantly different between the ENDO-U and EXO treatments 
                                                          
32 As an anonymous referee pointed out, this result may have been caused by two possibilities: (a) voting for the 
partner matching protocol raises subjects’ beliefs, or (b) merely optimistic subjects vote for the partner matching 
option. To exclude possibility (b), I calculated the fraction of subjects who believed that peers contributed more than 
ten points or contributed the full endowment (20 points), out of the total number of subjects in a given treatment, not 
out of the number of subjects under partner matching. The fractions of those who believed peers’ contribution of 
more than ten points (20 points) were 34.38% (14.06%), 43.75% (18.75%) and 26.47% (7.35%) in the ENDO-U, 
ENDO-M and EXO treatments, respectively. These calculations are consistent with the pattern that possibility (a) 
implies. The difference in the fraction of those who believed their peers’ contribution to be more than ten points (20 
points) is significant at two-sided p = .0373 (.0507) in the ENDO-M treatment, while it is not significant in the 
ENDO-U treatment. This suggests that the impact of factor (a) is stronger in the ENDO-M than in the ENDO-U 
treatment, which is consistent with other analyses which will be reported in Section 4.5. 
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when partner matching is in effect (column (2), Table 5).33 This rapid decline of beliefs in the 
ENDO-U treatment is in contrast with subjects’ action choices: subjects’ average contribution 
amounts did not decline very quickly with the democratic decision process (Table 2). In the 
ENDO-M treatment, although the average beliefs were always higher than those in the EXO 
treatment (Table 4), the former is not significantly different from the latter according to a 
regression analysis due to high variation (column (4), Table 5). This is in contrast with subjects’ 
strong contribution behaviors displayed in the ENDO-M treatment (columns (4) to (6) in Table 
3). These observations on beliefs and action choices provide tentative evidence that democratic 
decision-making itself have directly affected the subjects’ contribution behavior via a channel 
other than beliefs (e.g., Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman, 2010; Kamei, 2016). 
In order to formally explore the role of subjects’ beliefs on their decisions to contribute, I 
conducted regressions that included subjects’ beliefs as an additional independent variable in the 
same specifications as Table 3. In this analysis, I further added the interaction term between the 
belief variable and the Endo dummy variable as an independent variable to analyze how the 
correlation between subject’s own contribution amounts and beliefs differ by the presence of the 
democratic decision process. Two interesting patterns were found. First, as shown in Table 6, the 
Endo dummy either no longer obtains a significant coefficient or has a much smaller point 
estimate (even if significant), once the beliefs are controlled for. The variable for subjects’ 
beliefs obtains a significantly positive coefficient in every specification. This implies that one 
driver for the highly significant impact of democracy seen in Result 2 could be subjects’ more 
optimistic beliefs in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments than in the EXO treatment. Second, 
democracy directly affects subjects’ contribution behaviors positively through a channel other 
than beliefs in the ENDO-M treatment, the treatment with the stronger effect of democratic 
decision-making, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on the Endo dummy (see 
column (6)).34  
 
                                                          
33 This weak significant result is not robust. The Endo dummy fails to obtain a significant coefficient if an ordered 
probit regression model is used. The average beliefs across all the supergames are also not significantly different 
between the ENDO-U and EXO treatments according to two-sided Mann-Whitney tests (p-value = .2752).  
34 Whether this holds also for the ENDO-U treatment is ambiguous because while the Endo dummy has a 
significantly positive coefficient in column (3), the interaction term between the Endo dummy and the belief 
variable has a significantly negative coefficient. 
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Result 4: (i) Beliefs on interaction peers’ contribution amounts formed by subjects who 
implemented the partner matching protocol in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments were 
significantly higher than those formed by subjects who were given the same protocol in the EXO 
treatment in the 1st supergame. (ii) Result 2(i) was partly caused by subjects’ beliefs enhanced by 
the endogenous adoption of partner matching. However, (iii) democracy also directly affected 
subjects’ contribution behaviors through channels other than beliefs, particularly in the ENDO-
M treatment.  
 
As is usually the case in this kind of study, we cannot disentangle the effects on beliefs 
(Result 4(ii)) into signaling effects and democracy premiums. Nevertheless, Result 4(iii) 
suggests that democracy premiums should be part of the story that accounts for Result 2 in the 
ENDO-M treatment. 
 
4.4. The Process to Implement the Partner Matching Protocol and Subjects’ Contribution 
Behavior 
As mentioned earlier, the number of voting stages required to reach a consensus in the 
ENDO-U treatment, as well as the number of supporters for the partner matching protocol (“Y-
voter,” hereafter) in the ENDO-M treatment, differed by group (Result 1(ii)). In Section 4.4, I 
explore how the differences in agreement pattern affected subjects’ belief formation and action 
choices.  
Figure 2 reports the average contributions and beliefs under the partner matching protocol 
by the number of voting stages spent in the ENDO-U treatment, or by the number of the Y-voters 
in the ENDO-M treatment.35 Two clear patterns were found regarding subjects’ contribution 
behaviors. First, subjects’ contribution amounts in the ENDO-U treatment were clearly higher 
when they underwent a small number of voting stages to reach a consensus, compared with 
subjects in the EXO treatment (Panel I(a)). They contributed much less, however, when they 
instead had to undergo all 20 voting stages, compared with subjects in the EXO treatment. 
Second, the higher number of supports a group had for implementing the partner matching 
protocol in the ENDO-M treatment, the higher average contribution they achieved (Panel II(a)). 
                                                          
35 See Appendix Table C.6 for the statistical tests that check whether the differences between the ENDO-U or 
ENDO-M treatment and the EXO treatment are significant. 
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Especially, when all four members supported the partner matching protocol, the average 
contributions were 58.6% and 60.3% higher than those in the EXO treatment in the 1st SG data 
and All SG data, respectively. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Notice, however, that the differences in the average contribution between the ENDO-M and 
EXO treatments drastically shrink when not all members vote for the partner matching protocol. 
Nevertheless, the average contributions in the ENDO-M treatment never become lower than 
those in the EXO treatment, unlike in the ENDO-U treatment.   
 
Result 5: (i) The smaller the number of voting stages that a group underwent to achieve a 
consensus, the larger the average contribution that the group achieved in the ENDO-U 
treatment. (ii) The higher the number of supports a group had when implementing the partner 
matching protocol, the higher the average contribution that the group achieved in the ENDO-M 
treatment. 
 
Subjects’ beliefs are reported in Panels (b) of Figure 2. It first indicates that in the 
ENDO-U treatment, regardless of the number of voting stages to reach a consensus, democratic 
decision-making enhances subjects’ beliefs in the first supergame. This suggests that the impact 
of voting on beliefs was present, regardless of the duration of voting, under the unanimity rule. 
Recall, however, that subjects in groups that underwent the full set of voting stages contributed 
much less (Panel I(a) in Figure 2). This implies that the democratic decision process alone is not 
enough to persuade some very uncooperative subjects to cooperate. The result is similar to Dal 
Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010) and Kamei (2016) where majority rules were used. In Dal Bó, 
Foster and Putterman (2010) and Kamei (2016), only supporters of a policy exhibited the 
positive effects from democratic decision-making. If we use data from all supergames, we 
observed positive correlations between subjects’ beliefs and the numbers of voting stages spent 
on implementing the partner matching protocol (see again Panel I(b)).  
Second, in the ENDO-M treatment, the patterns of subjects’ beliefs are almost the same 
as those of their contribution behaviors in both the data from the first supergame and from all 
supergames. These patterns seem to imply that voting has a stronger functioning for a 
cooperative subject to send a signal of future cooperation in the ENDO-M than in the ENDO-U 
treatment.  
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Result 6: (i) Democratic decision-making enhanced subjects’ beliefs, regardless of how many 
voting stages they underwent for an agreement, in the first supergame in the ENDO-U treatment.  
(ii) The higher number of Y-voters a group had, the more likely group members believed that 
their peers were to contribute large amounts in the ENDO-M treatment. 
 
4.5. Subjects’ Belief Formation and Decision to Contribute by the Voter Type 
We found that the impact of democracy is stronger when the majority rule, rather than the 
unanimity rule, is applied (Result 2(ii) and Result 3). Lastly, I will explore possible causes for 
this result by studying how subjects’ voting preferences and the voting patterns in the group are 
linked to their decisions to contribute.  
In the ENDO-U treatment, subjects continued to vote until they reached a consensus. I 
first classified subjects into those who voted for or against the partner matching protocol in the 
first voting stage (“initial Y-voters” and “initial N-voters,” hereafter), and then investigated how 
the duration of voting stages affected their belief formation and decisions to contribute under the 
partner matching (Panel I of Table 7). Two interesting patterns were found. First, the initial Y-
voters on average contributed larger amounts than the initial N-voters did, but the difference is 
not significant when we use the round 1 behaviors in the 1st SG or all SG data (columns (1a) and 
(2a) in Panel I(a)). In addition, the beliefs formed by the initial Y-voters are not significantly 
different from those by the initial N-voters in the first supergame (column (1a) in Panel I(b)). 
This seem to suggest that initial votes casted by subjects were not precise indicators of subjects’ 
willingness to contribute. This also implies that voters’ signaling effects may have been weak in 
the ENDO-U treatment.36 Second, the larger number of voting stages that a subject went through, 
the smaller amounts she believed that their peers would contribute and the smaller amounts she 
herself contributed to the public account.37 This holds, regardless of whether a subject is an 
                                                          
36 As an anonymous referee pointed out, the unanimity rule in that all voters must agree on one matching option by 
repeated voting may have made subjects behave strategically, as has been shown in jury decisions to convict 
(Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey, 2000) or in voter turnout decisions in election (Battaglini, Morton and 
Palfrey, 2010). Possible strategic voting may partly account for these small differences in behaviors between the 
initial Y-voters and the initial N-voters and also for Results 2(ii) and 3. 
37 I also conducted the same regression while controlling for the ratio of the average realized group contribution to 
i’s belief in the previous supergame. To include the recent experience variable as an independent variable, I 
restricted data to observations after the first supergame where groups operated under the partner matching protocol 
for two adjacent supergames. Although the number of available data diminishes, the number of voting stages has a 
significantly negative coefficient for the initial Y-voters’ decisions to contribute at the 1% level. 
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initial Y-voter or an initial N-voter, except for the belief formation by the initial N-voters in the 
1st supergame.38 The effects are strong in all specifications. This suggests that subjects interpret a 
short (long) duration of voting stage as their peers’ high (low) willingness to contribute. 
 
Result 7: (i) The larger number of voting stages a subject experienced in the ENDO-U 
treatment, the smaller amounts she believed that their peers would contribute and the smaller 
amounts she herself contributed. 
 
Subjects cast votes once in each supergame in the ENDO-M treatment. I denote subjects 
who voted against the partner matching protocol (those who are not Y-voters) as the “N-voters.” 
Two clear patterns were found (Panel II of Table 7). First, the Y-voters contributed by far larger 
amounts than N-voters did (Panel II(a)). This suggests that unlike the ENDO-U treatment, 
subjects’ votes in the ENDO-M treatment were clearly linked to their decisions to contribute and 
thus were presumably clear signals of their inclinations to cooperate. This interpretation can also 
be seen in the data from beliefs. The Y-voters formed significantly higher beliefs on the peers’ 
contribution behaviors than the N-voters did, when the partner matching protocol was imposed in 
accord with their voting (Panel II(b)). Second, the numbers of N-voters are on average negatively 
correlated with Y-voters’ decisions to contribute. Also, the Y-voters’ beliefs are negatively 
correlated with the number of N-voters in their group. These are similar to Result 7(i), although 
the correlations are not statistically significant for the majority of the specifications. 
 
Result 7: (ii) The Y-voters formed much higher beliefs regarding the peers’ contribution 
behaviors and then contributed significantly more than the N-voters did under partner matching 
in the ENDO-M treatment.  
 
As discussed in Result 1(i), the partner matching protocol received overwhelming 
supports from the first supergame. Nevertheless, subjects’ experiences in the previous supergame 
may make subjects re-consider which matching protocol to vote for in a given supergame. If 
subjects cast more honest preferences in voting in the ENDO-M than in the ENDO-U treatment, 
the past experiences may affect their voting behaviors more strongly in the former than in the 
                                                          
38 The number of voting stages has a significantly positive coefficient for belief formation by the initial N-voters in 
the 1st supergame (column (1c) in Panel I(b)). However this probably happened by chance due to small sample. This 
independent variable has a significantly negative coefficient if we use data from all supergames (column (2c) in 
Panel I(b)). 
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latter treatment. As shown in Appendix Table C.7, the data confirm this conjecture. In both of 
the two endogenous treatments, the higher the average group contribution, relative to her belief, 
that subject i experienced under partner matching, the more likely that i was to vote for the 
partner matching protocol in the next supergame; but this relationship is significant only for the 
ENDO-M treatment. 
The pro-cooperation aspect that high credibility of subjects’ voting in the ENDO-M 
treatment produced can also be checked by comparing (a) the groups with four Y-voters in that 
treatment with (b) the groups with four initial Y-voters in the ENDO-U treatment. As shown in 
Figure 2, the former groups had much higher levels of beliefs and then achieved clearly higher 
levels of contribution than the latter.39  
In summary, these analyses suggest that Results 2(ii) and 3 can be explained by the 
difference in subjects’ voting behaviors between the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments. 
5. Conclusions 
 This paper explored whether people collectively prefer to play with each other in a 
partner matching, rather than a random matching, environment, and whether the democratic 
selection of the partner matching protocol mitigates subjects’ uncooperative behaviors. My 
experiment, the framework of which is a linear public goods game, provided affirmative answers 
to both of the questions. First, most groups selected the partner matching protocol from the very 
first supergame. Second, subjects’ levels of contributions were significantly higher when they 
decided to act under the partner matching protocol by voting than when they were given the 
same protocol exogenously. The data further indicated that the impact of democracy is not due to 
selection bias, but could be due to signals sent through voting and/or democracy premiums. The 
importance of democratic decision-making for beliefs and behavior is similar to recent findings 
in the experimental literature (e.g. Tyran and Feld, 2006; Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman, 2010; 
Kamei, 2016; Sutter, Haigner and Kocher, 2010), and the evidence presented here is the first 
                                                          
39 The differences in average contribution between these two sets of groups are significant at two-sided p 
= .012, .028, and .001 when round 1 behaviors in the 1st supergame, and those in all supergames, and rounds 1-3 
behaviors in all supergames, respectively, are used, according to tobit regressions. The differences in average belief 
between these two sets of groups are significant at two-sided p = .001, and .002 when beliefs in the 1st supergame 
and all supergames, respectively, are used, according to tobit regressions. 
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demonstration in the context of indefinitely repeated situations. The results were robust to the 
type of voting rule used: the unanimity rule or the majority rule. 
 Nevertheless, an interesting difference between the two voting rules was also found. The 
impact of voting on enhancing cooperation was stronger under the majority rule than under the 
unanimity rule. Moreover, the impact was well sustained under the majority rule, but it 
diminished from round to round within supergames under the unanimity rule. I acknowledge that 
there are many other voting rules, such as supermajority rule. How the strength of the democracy 
effect differs by other voting rule remains an interesting avenue for future research. 
Recently Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Eyster (2017) show that voters may make systematic errors 
by underappreciating peers’ responses to a policy when undertaking voting decisions. In their 
experiment, the majority of subjects voted against levying a tax in a prisoner’s dilemma which 
makes cooperation a dominant strategy, even though the imposition of tax improves overall 
welfare.40 So, why did almost all groups in the present experiment select the partner matching 
protocol? There is a stark difference in the experimental design between Dal Bo, Dal Bó and 
Eyster (2017) and my study. While the tax changed both the payoff matrix and the set of equilibria 
in Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Eyster (2017), subjects in the current study were confronted with the same 
stage game for two voting options. Thus, arguably, predicting how subjects’ behaviors may 
change by the difference in the matching protocol may not have required high cognitive ability in 
this experiment. Recall that any symmetric, positive contribution situation is theoretically easier to 
achieve under the partner matching than under the random matching protocol (Summary 3). The 
present experimental data in fact revealed that subjects anticipate that their peers would contribute 
much more in the partner matching than in the random matching, and that the difference between 
the sizes of subjects’ beliefs and realized contributions is small. This implies that subjects may not 
always underappreciate equilibrium effects. 
My experiment is also related to the literature on endogenous regrouping and partner 
choices. Past experimental studies, using finitely repeated setups, have shown that under certain 
conditions people improve cooperation in dilemmas if provided with an ability to choose with 
                                                          
40 In Kamei (2016), 53% of subjects voted against imposing non-deterrent sanctions even though average 
contributions were much higher when the sanction policy was imposed than otherwise.  
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whom they interact. The findings of my experiment imply that endogenous choices of players 
per se may partly account for the positive impact of endogenous group formation. 
As a final remark, I note that my paper also has a broad implication for experimental 
research on infinitely repeated dilemma games. Experimental work to investigate the possibility 
of cooperation is usually designed so that the basic rules of a game, such as continuation 
probability and matching protocol, are pre-determined without having endogenous features. This 
paper shows that letting subjects democratically select the partner matching protocol may 
enhance people’s willingness to contribute significantly in indefinitely repeated collective action 
dilemmas. This implication is that people’s behavior and equilibrium selection may be 
significantly affected by the way in which the basic rules of game are designed (endogenously 
versus exogenously). 
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Figure 1: Experimental Design 
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35 
 
Table 1: Summary of Treatments 
 
          
Treatment  
name 
Matching  
protocol 
 
The way in which 
matching protocol 
is decided in a 
group 
The number of groups that selected  
the partner matching protocol1 
 
   1st SG       2nd SG     3rd SG      4th SG       5th SG 
The # of  
subjects 
(sessions) 
          
          
ENDO-U  
(Endogenous, 
Unanimity) 
Partner or 
random 
matching 
Unanimity rule  15  
[16] 
15  
[16] 
11 
[16] 
14 
[16] 
15  
[16] 
64  
(3) 
ENDO-M 
(Endogenous, 
Majority) 
Partner or 
random 
matching 
Majority rule 15 
[16] 
13 
[16] 
13 
[16] 
10 
[16] 
12 
[16] 
64 
(3) 
EXO 
(Exogenous) 
Partner 
matching 
Always partner 
matching 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
68 
(3) 
 
       
Total   
    
 
196 
(9) 
 
 
Notes: 1 The numbers in the squared brackets indicate the total numbers of groups. I use the term SG as the 
abbreviation of supergame.  
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Table 2: Contribution Amounts in Each Supergame 
 1st SG 2nd SG 3rd SG 4th SG 5th SG All Supergames 
      
(a) The ENDO-U treatment      
Session 1      
  Partner matching 10.96 (6) 9.95 (5) 8.67 (3) 6.67 (6) 5.96 (6) 8.36 
  Random matching N/A (0) 4.75 (1) 5.50 (3) N/A (0) N/A (0) 5.31 
       
Session 2       
  Partner matching 11.19 (4) 11.35 (5) 10.00 (5) 8.94 (4) 9.85 (5) 10.28 
  Random matching 0.25 (1) N/A (0) N/A (0) 0.50 (1) N/A (0) 0.38 
       
Session 3       
  Partner matching 10.80 (5) 9.45 (5) 6.08 (3) 8.25 (4) 9.50 (4) 9.07 
  Random matching N/A (0) N/A (0) 2.75 (2) 2.00 (1) 0.75 (1) 2.06 
       
Average       
  Partner matching 10.97 (15) 10.25 (15) 8.57 (11) 7.77 (14) 8.20 (15) 9.20 
  Random matching 0.25 (1) 4.75 (1) 4.40 (5) 1.25 (2) 0.75 (1) 3.03 
       
(b) The ENDO-M treatment      
Session 7      
  Partner matching 12.44 (4) 9.44 (4) 6.83 (3) 6.42 (3) 7.00 (3) 8.72 
  Random matching 9.00 (1) 3.25 (1) 5.88 (2) 11.25 (2) 6.00 (2) 7.31 
       
Session 8       
  Partner matching 11.50 (5) 11.25 (4) 9.06 (4) 12.17 (3) 10.31 (4) 10.83 
  Random matching N/A (0) 7.75 (1) 4.75 (1) 4.75 (2) 1.25 (1) 4.65 
       
Session 9       
  Partner matching 13.29 (6) 11.20 (5) 10.42 (6) 9.31 (4) 9.40 (5) 10.87 
  Random matching N/A (0) 6.50 (1) N/A (0) 8.75 (2) 5.00 (1) 7.25 
       
Average       
  Partner matching 12.47 (15) 10.67 (13) 9.17 (13) 9.30 (10) 9.10 (12) 10.27 
  Random matching 9.00 (1) 5.83 (3) 5.50 (3) 8.25 (6) 4.56 (4) 6.51 
       
(c) The EXO treatment (Partner matching)      
Session 4 8.29 (6) 8.42 (6) 7.54 (6) 7.96 (6) 6.67 (6) 7.78 (6) 
Session 5 9.58 (6) 6.83 (6) 6.42 (6) 5.67 (6) 6.17 (6) 6.93 (6) 
Session 6 9.80 (5) 9.50 (5) 8.10 (5) 6.80 (5) 7.55 (5) 8.35 (5) 
       
Average 9.19 (17) 8.18 (17) 7.31 (17) 6.81 (17) 6.75 (17) 7.65 (17) 
       
 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of groups that operated in the regime in the first column of the corresponding row.  The average contributions 
were calculated using subjects’ round 1 behaviors in each supergame and session.   
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Table 3: The Effects of Democratic Decision-Making on Enhancing Cooperation  
 
 
 
       
Voting rule: Unanimity Rule Majority Rule 
Data: 1st Supergame All Supergames 1st Supergame All Supergames 
Period: Round 1 Round 1 Rounds 1-3 Round 1 Round 1 Rounds 1-3 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
(i) Endo dummy {= 1 for the 
ENDO-U and the ENDO-M 
treatments; 0 for the EXO 
treatment} 
2.42*** 
(.78) 
3.13*** 
(1.15) 
3.24** 
(1.33) 
5.21*** 
(1.20) 
4.74*** 
(1.25) 
5.77*** 
(2.40) 
       
(ii) Supergame number  
{= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}  
--- 
-.90*** 
(.14) 
-.96*** 
(.13) 
--- 
-.91*** 
(.15) 
-.96*** 
(.13) 
       
Interaction term:  
(i)  (ii) 
--- 
-.41 
(.49) 
.071 
(.34) 
--- 
-.45 
(.42) 
-.57 
(.65) 
       
(iii) Rounds within  
supergames {=1, 2, 3} 
--- --- 
-2.14*** 
(.17) 
--- --- 
-2.15*** 
(.17) 
       
Interaction term: 
(i)  (iii) 
--- --- 
-1.13** 
(.54) 
--- --- 
-.29 
(.42) 
       
Constant 9.46*** 
(.74) 
9.77*** 
(.44) 
11.8*** 
(.49) 
9.55*** 
(.84) 
9.78*** 
(.45) 
11.8*** 
(.50) 
       
# of observations 128 620 1,452 128 592 1,428 
# of left-censored observations 16 129 415 19 117 363 
# of right-censored observations 29 100 161 38 106 196 
Log likelihood  -356.1 -1702.6 -3812.2 -332.9 -1618.3 -3791.1 
       
 
 
 
Notes: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Observations only in groups that 
operated under the partner matching protocol were used. The observations from the ENDO-U and EXO treatments 
were used for columns (1) to (3), while the observations from the ENDO-M and EXO treatments were used for 
columns (4) to (6). The dependent variable is contribution amount of subject i in a given round of a given 
supergame. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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Table 4: Beliefs on Matched Partners’ Average Contribution Amounts in Each Supergame 
 
 1st SG 2nd SG 3rd SG 4th SG 5th SG All Supergames 
      
(a) The ENDO-U treatment      
 
     
Session 1      
  Partner matching 11.63 (6) 11.10 (5) 7.58 (3) 6.92 (6) 6.83 (6) 8.87 
  Random matching N/A (0) 7.75 (1) 4.58 (3) N/A (0) N/A (0) 5.38 
       
Session 2       
  Partner matching 10.25 (4) 8.40 (5) 7.10 (5) 6.00 (4) 6.50 (5) 7.61 
  Random matching 3.25 (1) N/A (0) N/A (0) 0.75 (1) N/A (0) 2.00 
       
Session 3       
  Partner matching 11.15 (5) 10.90 (5) 7.75 (3) 7.44 (4) 7.44 (4) 9.10 
  Random matching N/A (0) N/A (0) 8.125 (2) 2.75 (1) 2.75 (1) 5.44 
       
Average       
  Partner matching 11.10 (15) 10.13 (15) 7.41 (11) 6.80 (14) 6.88 (15) 8.57 
  Random matching 3.25 (1) 7.75 (1) 6.00 (5) 1.75 (2) 2.75 (1) 4.34 
       
(b) The ENDO-M treatment      
      
Session 7       
  Partner matching 10.00 (4) 8.44 (4) 8.33 (3) 6.83 (3) 7.58 (3) 8.35 
  Random matching 5.00 (1) 7.25 (1) 4.63 (2) 9.38 (2) 5.88 (2) 6.50 
       
Session 8       
  Partner matching 11.65 (5) 10.88 (4) 10.13 (4) 8.58 (3) 10.88 (4) 10.58 
  Random matching N/A (0) 8.25 (1) 5.00 (1) 6.88 (2) 2.50 (1) 5.90 
       
Session 9       
  Partner matching 13.42 (6) 12.1 (5) 9.92 (6) 8.25 (4) 6.50 (5) 10.23 
  Random matching N/A (0) 5.25 (1) N/A (0) 7.25 (2) 8.75 (1) 7.13 
       
Average       
  Partner matching 11.72 (15) 10.30 (13) 9.47 (13) 8.36 (10) 8.27 (12) 9.67 
  Random matching 6.00 (1) 7.40 (3) 6.30 (3) 6.39 (6) 6.50 (4) 6.47 
       
(c) The EXO treatment (Partner matching)      
      
Session 4 9.63 (6) 9.67 (6) 8.04 (6) 6.67 (6) 7.29 (6) 8.26 
Session 5 8.83 (6) 8.17 (6) 7.67 (6) 4.46 (6) 4.58 (6) 6.74 
Session 6 11.10 (5) 9.40 (5) 8.35 (5) 8.50 (5) 6.60 (5) 8.79 
       
Average 9.78 (17) 9.06 (17) 8.00 (17) 6.43 (17) 6.13 (17) 7.88 
       
 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of groups that operated in the regime in the first column of the corresponding row as a result of voting.   
39 
 
Table 5: The Effects of Democratic Decision-Making on the Formation of Subjects’ Beliefs  
 
Dependent variable: Subject i’s belief on his or her three interaction partners’ average 
contribution amount in a given supergame 
 
 
 
     
Voting rule: Unanimity Rule Majority Rule 
Data: 1st Supergame All Supergames 1st Supergame All Supergames 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
(i) Endo dummy {= 1 for the 
ENDO-U and ENDO-M 
treatments; 0 for the EXO 
treatment} 
1.61** 
(.74) 
1.40*  
(.77) 
2.59* 
(1.41) 
2.14 
(1.81) 
     
(ii) Supergame number 
--- 
-1.03*** --- -1.04 
{= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} (.14)  (.14) 
     
Interaction term:  
(i)  (ii) 
--- 
-.24 
(.17) 
--- 
-.064 
(.53) 
     
Constant 9.85***  
(.66) 
11.0*** 
(.37) 
9.86 
(.67) 
11.0 
(.38) 
     
# of observations 128 620 128 592 
# of left-censored observations 4 22 5 21 
# of right-censored observations 14 23 17 34 
Log pseudo likelihood  -373.5 -1764.6 -372.1 -1719.5 
     
 
 
Notes: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. As for the ENDO-U and ENDO-M 
treatments, only observations in groups which selected the partner matching protocol were used. The numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors.  
    As a robustness check, I also conducted individual random-effects ordered probit regressions with standard errors 
clustered by session ID. The Endo dummies in the specification of columns (1) and (3) both obtain significantly 
positive coefficients at the 5% level. The Endo dummies in the specifications of columns (2) and (4) both fail to 
obtain significant coefficients. The results are included in Appendix Table C.5. 
    *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Table 6: The Role of Subjects’ Beliefs on Enhancing Cooperation  
 
Dependent variable: Contribution amount of subject i in a given round of a given supergame 
 
 
       
Voting rule: Unanimity Rule Majority Rule 
Data: 1st Supergame All Supergames 1st Supergame All Supergames 
Period: Round 1 Round 1 Rounds 1-3 Round 1 Round 1 Rounds 1-3 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
(i) Endo dummy {= 1 for the 
ENDO-U and the ENDO-M 
treatments; 0 for the EXO 
treatment} 
1.85 
(3.29) 
-.082 
(1.51) 
3.24*** 
(1.23) 
-2.93 
(5.20) 
1.81 
(2.63) 
6.68** 
(3.05) 
       
(ii) Supergame number  
{= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}  
--- 
.077 
(.084) 
-.64*** 
(.11) 
--- 
.077 
(.084) 
-.64*** 
(.11) 
       
Interaction term:  
(i)  (ii) 
--- 
-.075 
(.36) 
.15 
(.18) 
--- 
-.36 
(.48) 
-.71 
(.58) 
       
(iii) Rounds within  
supergames {=1, 2, 3} 
--- --- 
.74*** 
(.058) 
--- --- 
1.49*** 
(.35) 
       
Interaction term: 
(i)  (iii) 
--- --- 
-.062 
(.083) 
--- --- 
-.52 
(.71) 
       
(iv) Subject i’s belief on 
her peers’ avg. 
contribution 
1.19*** 
(.30) 
.98*** 
(.15) 
1.49*** 
(.35) 
1.24*** 
(.33) 
.99*** 
(.15) 
.75*** 
(.060) 
       
Interaction term:  
(i)  (iv) 
-.075 
(.34) 
.19 
(.16) 
-1.18** 
(.60) 
.49 
(.50) 
.10 
(.18) 
-.14 
(.094) 
       
Constant -2.22 
(2.97) 
-.88 
(1.62) 
2.08*** 
(.38) 
-2.72 
(3.19) 
-.91 
(1.64) 
2.06*** 
(.40) 
       
# of observations 128 620 1452 128 592 1,428 
# of left-censored 
observations 
16 129 415 19 117 363 
# of right-censored 
observations 
29 100 161 38 106 196 
Log likelihood  -329.2 -1635.0 -3765.6 -298.2 -1548.3 -3745.2 
       
 
 
 
Notes: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Observations only in groups that 
operated under the partner matching protocol were used. The observations from the ENDO-U and EXO treatments 
were used for columns (1) to (3), while the observations from the ENDO-M and EXO treatments were used for 
columns (4) to (6). The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Figure 2: Average Contributions and Beliefs under the Partner Matching Protocol by the Voting Pattern 
 
                
                           (a) Average contribution amounts                                                                     (b) Average beliefs  
(I) Average Data in the ENDO-U Treatment by the Number of Voting Stages Required to Reach a Consensus 
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                          (a) Average contribution amounts#1                                                             (b) Average beliefs 
 
(II) Average Data in the ENDO-M Treatment by the Number of Y-Voters 
 
Notes: 𝑐𝐸𝑋𝑂̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑐𝐸𝑋𝑂
𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
) is the average contribution (average belief) in the EXO treatment in panel (a) (panel (b)). #1 There are zero cases in which the number of 
supports was two and the computer randomly implemented the partner matching protocol in the first supergame.  
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Table 7: Average Contributions and Beliefs by Voter Type in the Partner Matching Protocol 
 
I. The ENDO-U Treatment 
(a) Average Contribution 
          
Data: 1st Supergame  All Supergames  
Period: Round 1 Round 1 Rounds 1-3 
Independent Variable: 
(1a) 
both voters 
(1b) 
Initial Y-
voters 
(1c) 
Initial N-
voters 
(2a) 
both voters 
(2b) 
Initial Y-
voters 
(2c) 
Initial N-
voters 
(3a) 
both voters 
(3b) 
Initial 
Y-voters 
(3c) 
Initial 
N-voters 
          
          
Initial Y-voter  
dummy 
3.00 
(2.63) 
--- --- 3.50 
(2.83) 
  --- --- 3.23** 
(1.38) 
--- --- 
          
The number of 
voting stages 
--- 
-.23*** 
(.052) 
-.41*** 
(.15) 
--- 
-.45*** 
(.057) 
-.11*** 
(.099) 
--- 
-.49*** 
(.025) 
-.27*** 
(.12) 
          
Constant 9.52*** 
(2.10) 
13.36*** 
(.95) 
11.84*** 
(2.17) 
6.28** 
(3.09) 
11.16*** 
(.59) 
7.07*** 
(2.42) 
3.35*** 
(1.16) 
7.97*** 
(.53) 
5.32*** 
(1.05) 
          
# of observations 60 47 13 280 217 63 692 545 147 
# of left-censored 
observations 
6 5 1 62 44 18 221 167 54 
# of right-censored 
observations 
15 14 1 57 48 9 97 84 13 
Log likelihood  -165.7 -126.0 -34.4 -744.5 -577.9 -164.4 -1769.0 -1398.3 -364.1 
          
 
(b) Average Belief 
       
Data: 1st Supergame All Supergames 
Independent Variable: 
(1a) 
both voters 
(1b) 
Initial Y-
voters 
(1c) 
Initial N-
voters 
(2a) 
both voters 
(2b) 
Initial Y-
voters 
(2c) 
Initial 
N-voters 
       
       
Initial Y-voter  
dummy 
-1.24 
(1.27) 
--- --- 1.05** 
(.41) 
--- --- 
       
The number of 
voting stages 
--- 
-.29*** 
(.022) 
.29*** 
(.049) 
--- 
-.17** 
(.082) 
-.048** 
(.018) 
       
Constant 12.43*** 
(1.11) 
11.98*** 
(.53) 
10.67*** 
(.56) 
7.74*** 
(.19) 
9.33*** 
(.61) 
8.03*** 
(.21) 
       
# of observations 60 47 13 280 217 63 
# of left-censored 
observations 
1 1 0 10 5 5 
# of right-censored 
observations 
9 7 2 13 11 2 
Log likelihood  -172.7 -136.1 -34.4 -809.4 -623.2 -183.5 
        
Notes: Tobit regressions with standard errors clustered by session ID. Observations only in groups from the ENDO-
U treatment that operated under the partner matching protocol were used. The Initial Y-voter dummy equals 1(0) if a 
subject voted for (against) the partner matching protocol in the first voting stage.  
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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II. The ENDO-M Treatment 
 
(a) Average Contribution 
          
Data: 1st Supergame  All Supergames  
Period: Round 1 Round 1 Rounds 1-3 
Independent Variable: 
(1a) 
both voters 
(1b) 
Y-voters 
(1c) 
N-voters 
(2a) 
both voters 
(2b) 
Y-voters 
(2c) 
N-voters 
(3a) 
both voters 
(3b) 
Y-voters 
(3c) 
N-voters 
          
          
Y-voter dummy 13.81*** 
(3.74) 
--- --- 4.84* 
(2.76) 
  --- --- 1.94** 
(.98) 
--- --- 
          
The number of 
N-voters 
--- 
-6.51 
(5.56) 
N/A#1 --- 
-3.06* 
(1.68) 
.11 
(2.36) 
--- 
-3.16 
(1.92) 
.34 
(1.75) 
          
Constant 3.51*** 
(3.67) 
20.68*** 
(2.94) 
5.16*** 
(3.78) 
6.84*** 
(1.14) 
13.86*** 
(1.66) 
6.86*** 
(3.88) 
7.00*** 
(.73) 
11.03*** 
(1.01) 
6.78*** 
(2.50) 
          
# of observations 60 52 8 252 201 51 668 539 129 
# of left-censored 
observations 
9 6 3 50 36 14 169 136 33 
# of right-censored 
observations 
24 24 0 63 56 7 132 114 18 
Log likelihood  -138.0 -115.4 -21.0 -657.4 -519.7 -135.5 -1746.2 -1392.5 -347.0 
          
 
(b) Average Belief 
       
Data: 1st Supergame All Supergames 
Independent Variable: 
(1a) 
both voters 
(1b) 
Y-voters 
(1c) 
N-voters 
(2a) 
both voters 
(2b) 
Y-voters 
(2c) 
N-voters 
       
       
Y-voter  
dummy 
6.70*** 
(.50) 
--- --- 3.08*** 
(1.09) 
--- --- 
       
The number of 
N-voters 
--- 
-3.66** 
(1.76) 
N/A#1 --- 
-2.57*** 
(-2.57) 
-.061 
(.64) 
       
Constant 6.70*** 
(1.61) 
15.15*** 
(1.54) 
6.90*** 
(1.61) 
7.53*** 
(.20) 
12.40*** 
(.89) 
7.65*** 
(.71) 
       
# of observations 60 52 8 252 201 51 
# of left-censored 
observations 
2 1 1 9 5 4 
# of right-censored 
observations 
12 12 0 24 23 1 
Log likelihood  -167.2 -143.1 -21.33 -743.0 -591.0 -143.6 
       
 
Notes: Tobit regressions with standard errors clustered by session ID. Observations only in groups from the ENDO-
M treatment that operated under the partner matching protocol were used. The Y-voter dummy equals 1(0) if a 
subject voted for (against) the partner matching protocol. The number of N-voters is 0, 1 or 2. 
#1 The number of N-voters is either 0 or 1 in the first supergame (Figure 2). 
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Appendix B: Theoretical Consideration for Groups that Collectively Select the Random 
Matching Protocol in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments 
In this part of the Appendix, I first show that the mutual full contribution situation holds 
as an equilibrium outcome (Section B.1). I then illustrate that there also exists a symmetric, 
positive less-than-full-contribution equilibrium for any contribution level ξ ∈ {1, 2, …, 19} 
(Section B.2). 
B.1. Mutual Full Contribution Equilibrium 
In order to illustrate that there are no incentives to deviate from the mutual full 
contribution situation, I consider a very extreme case in which all (six) groups in a session 
selected the random matching protocol in an endogenous (either ENDO-U or ENDO-M) 
treatment and that all subjects in these groups have contributed their full endowment amount (E) 
so far (before round t) in a given round. I also suppose that subjects have acted on a grim trigger 
strategy until this round. I show that even in this situation subject i decides not to defect. This 
suggests that the mutual full contribution equilibrium exists independently to the number of 
groups that selected the random matching protocol (∈{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}). The reasoning is the 
following: the more groups that select the random matching protocol in a given supergame, the 
higher the incentive for a subject i to deviate in that supergame, because i can more easily engage 
in the hit-and-run strategy (defect and then escape from the current group members) if more 
groups select the random matching protocol.  
Suppose that the subject i’s three peers and all subjects in other groups that selected the 
random matching protocol continue to choose the grim trigger strategy in round t and onward in 
a given supergame. 
If subject i also continues to act on the grim trigger strategy for the rest of rounds in the 
given supergame, she would obtain the following expected payoff: 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖] = ∑ 𝛿
𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑡(𝑐𝑖,𝑡)
∞
𝑠=𝑡 =
𝑟∙𝑁∙𝐸
1−𝛿
= 128, (B1) 
where δ = .75, r = .4, N = 4 and E = 20. 
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Step 1: There are no incentives for subject i to contribute 0 points in round t and then return to 
the full contribution in round t + 1 
Suppose that i contributes 0 points in round t but returns to full contribution in round t + 
1. In this scenario, subject i obtains E – 0 + r∙(N – 1)∙E = 44 points in round t. The expected 
payoff of subject i in round t + 1 is computed as: 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+1] = 32 ∙
(203 )(
3
0)
(233 )
+ 24 ∙
(202 )(
3
1)
(233 )
+ 16 ∙
(201 )(
3
2)
(233 )
+ 8 ∙
(200 )(
3
3)
(233 )
≈ 28.8696. (B2) 
After round t + 1, any subject that encounters at least one 0-contributor in round t, round t + 1 or 
later rounds also becomes a 0-contributor. The three peers of subject i in round t are 0-
contributors in round t + 2 with a probability of 100%. The probability that a subject j in a group 
to which subject i’s did not belong in round t does not become a 0-contributor in round t + 2 is 
calculated as: 
𝑝 ≡
(203 )(
3
0)
(233 )
=
1140
1771
≈ 64.37%, 
because the number of full contributors except j in round t + 1 is 20. Here, I claim that the 
probability that j remains to be a full contributor in round t + 3 (p’) is less than 12%, regardless 
of i’s action choice in round t + 2 as below: 
Claim: p’ < .12.  
When i contributed E points in round t + 2,  
𝑝′ ≡ 𝑝 ∙
𝑝3(193 )(
3
0)+1∙𝑝
2(192 )(
3
0)
(233 )
= .1197 < .12. 
When i contributed 0 points in round t + 2, 
𝑝′ ≡ 𝑝 ∙
𝑝3(193 )(
3
0)
(233 )
= .0939 < .12. 
This calculation indicates that p’ < .12. ■ 
 
Subject i would obtain the largest per-round payoff in round t + 2 when i contributes 0 points in 
round t + 2: 
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 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+2]|𝑐𝑖,𝑡+2=0
= 20 + 8 ∙ [(3𝑝3 + 2𝑝2(1 − 𝑝) + 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)2) ∙
(203 )(
3
0)
(233 )
+ (2𝑝2 +
𝑝(1 − 𝑝))
(202 )(
3
1)
(233 )
+ 𝑝 ∙
(201 )(
3
2)
(233 )
],   (B3) 
which equals 28.961. 
The per-round expected payoff that subject i obtains after round t + 2 is less than the 
round t + 3 expected payoff when i contributed 0 points (while assuming p’ = .12), which is 
equal to around 21.014 (this value is obtained by evaluating Eq. (B3) by substituting p = .12). 
Thus, we have the following inequality for i’s after round t + 2: 
𝐸𝑡[∑ 𝛿
𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡+3 ] ≪
𝛿3
1−𝛿
𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+3] < max
𝛿3
1−𝛿
𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+3] <
(.75)3∙21.014
1−.75
≈ 35.46. 
Therefore,  
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖] = 𝐸𝑡[∑ 𝛿
𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡 ] ≪ 44 + 𝛿 ∙ 28.87 + 𝛿
2 ∙ 28.96 + 35.46 = 117.4, (B4) 
which is lower than the sum of total expected payoffs under the mutual full contribution situation 
calculated in Eq. (B1). This means that contributing 0 points in round t and then returning to the 
full contribution in round t + 1 is not the best response for subject i. 
Step 2: There are no incentives for subject i to contribute 0 points in both round t and round t + 1 
 Suppose that subject i contributes 0 points in round t + 1, in addition to round t. Then, the 
expected payoff of subject i in round t + 1 is computed as: 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+1] = 20 + [24 ∙
(203 )(
3
0)
(233 )
+ 16 ∙
(202 )(
3
1)
(233 )
+ 8 ∙
(201 )(
3
2)
(233 )
] ≈ 40.8696. (B5) 
The probability that a subject j in a group to which subject i did not belong in round t does not 
become a 0-contributor in round t + 2 is: 
𝑞 =
(193 )(
3
0)
(233 )
=
969
1771
= 54.71% < 54.75%, 
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because the number of full contributors other than j in round t + 1 is 19. Thus, subject i’s 
expected payoff in round t + 2 is less than or equal to the value of Eq. (B3) evaluated at p = q 
= .5475: i.e., 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+2] < 26.84.  
Here, I claim that the probability that j remains to be a full contributor in round t + 3 (q’) 
is less than 6.49%, regardless of i’s action choice in round t + 2. 
Claim: q’ < .0649. 
When i contributed E points in round t + 2, 
𝑞′ ≡ 𝑞 ∙
𝑞3(193 )(
3
0)+𝑞
2(192 )(
3
0)
(233 )
= .06485 < .0649. 
When i contributed 0 points in round t + 2, 
𝑞′ ≡ 𝑞 ∙
𝑞3(193 )(
3
0)
(233 )
= .049 < .05. 
This calculation indicates that q’ < .0649. ■ 
 
The per-round expected payoff that subject i obtains after round t + 2 is less than her round t + 3 
expected payoff when i contributed 0 points in round t + 3 while assuming q’ = .0649, whose 
payoff is equal to around 20.53 (this value is obtained by evaluating Eq. (B3) by substituting p = 
q’ = .0649). Thus, we have the following inequality for i’s payoffs after round t + 2: 
𝐸𝑡[∑ 𝛿
𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡+3 ] ≪
𝛿3
1−𝛿
𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖,𝑡+3] <
(.75)3∙20.53 
1−.75
≈ 34.65. 
In other words, we obtain the following strict inequality: 
 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑖] = 𝐸𝑡[∑ 𝛿
𝑠−𝑡 ∙ 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
∞
𝑠=𝑡 ] ≪ 44 + 𝛿 ∙ 40.87 + 𝛿
2 ∙ 26.84 + 34.65 ≈ 124.40. (B6) 
This expected payoff (left-hand side) is lower than the sum of expected payoffs in the mutual full 
contribution situation calculated in Eq. (B1). This result means that contributing 0 points in both 
rounds t and t + 1 is not a materially beneficial deviation for subject i. 
 
The Steps 1 and 2 above suggest that the mutual full contribution situation holds as an 
equilibrium outcome. 
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B.2. Symmetric, Positive, but Less-than-full-Contribution Equilibrium 
Calculations similar to Section B.1 show that there also exists a symmetric, positive, but 
less-than-full-contribution equilibrium for each contribution level ξ ∈ {1, 2, …, 19}. The 
following table indicates the summary of the calculations. For each level ξ, I considered the two 
cases (Step 1 and Step 2) as in Section B.1. 
  
ξ Total expected payoff from 
symmetric, positive 
contribution equilibrium with 
the level of ξ points (= E + 
(rN – 1)ξ/(1 –δ)) 
The supremum of the expected payoff 
when i contributes 0 in round t and 
then returns to contribute ξ points in 
round t + 1 (Eq.(B4), included in step 
1 above, calculated for each ξ points) 
The supremum of the expected 
payoff when i contributes 0 in both 
rounds t and t + 1 (Eq.(B6), in step 
2 above, calculated for each ξ 
points) 
1 82.4 81.9 82.2  
2 84.8 83.7 84.4  
3 87.2 85.6 86.7  
4 89.6 87.5 88.9  
5 92.0 89.4 91.1  
6 94.4 91.2 93.3  
7 96.8 93.1 95.5  
8 99.2 95.0 97.8  
9 101.6 96.8 100.0  
10 104.0 98.7 102.2  
11 106.4 100.6 104.4  
12 108.8 102.4 106.6  
13 111.2 104.3 108.9  
14 113.6 106.2 111.1  
15 116.0 107.3 113.3  
16 118.4 109.9 115.5  
17 120.8 111.8 117.7  
18 123.2 113.7 112.0  
19 125.6 115.5 122.2  
20 128.0#1 117.4#2 124.4#3 
 
Notes: #1 This is the case of the full contribution equilibrium (see Section B.1 for the details). The payoff was 
calculated with Eq. (B1). #2 This was calculated with Eq. (B4). #3 This was calculated with Eq. (B6). 
 
This table indicates that deviating from contributing ξ points is not materially beneficial for each 
subject, assuming that all of their peers are employing the grim trigger strategy in that they 
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contribute ξ points until they observe that at least one of peers contribute less than ξ points; and 
once they see such defection they begin to contribute 0 points until the end of a given supergame.  
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Appendix C: Additional Figures and Tables 
Figure C.1: The Trends of Average Contributions by Session. 
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Table C.1: Distribution of Votes by Group 
I. The Number of Voting Stages Required to Reach a Consensus by Group in the ENDO-U 
treatment 
 
(a) Session 1 
The # of voting stages required so 
that groups reached an agreement 
1st SG 2nd SG 3rd SG 4th SG 5th SG 
1 2 groups 3 groups  1 group 1 group 
2 2 groups 2 groups  3 groups 3 groups 
3   1 group   
4  1 group 2 groups 1 group  
5   2 groups 1 group  
6      
7 1 group     
8      
9      
10   1 group  1 group 
11      
12      
13      
14      
15      
16      
17      
18      
19      
20 1 group #1    1 group #2 
Average 6.6 2.2 6.2 3.2 7.4 
 
(b) Session 2 
The # of voting stages required so 
that groups reached an agreement 
1st SG 2nd SG 3rd SG 4th SG 5th SG 
1 3 groups 2 groups 2 groups 1 group 1 group 
2  1 group 1 group   
3 2 groups 1 group  1 group  
4   1 group   
5    1 group  
6  1 group   2 groups 
7      
8      
9   1 group   
10      
11      
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12      
13     1 group 
14      
15      
16      
17      
18      
19      
20    2 groups #3 1 group #4 
Average 1.8 2.6 3.4 9.8 9.2 
 
(c) Session 3 
The # of voting stages required so 
that groups reached an agreement 
1st SG 2nd SG 3rd SG 4th SG 5th SG 
1  1 group 1 group 3 groups 2 groups 
2 4 groups  1 group 1 group 2 groups 
3 1 group     
4      
5  2 groups 1 group   
6      
7  1 group    
8  1 group 1 group   
9   1 group  1 group 
10      
11      
12      
13      
14      
15      
16      
17      
18      
19      
20    1 group #5  
Average 2.2 5.2 5 5 3 
 
Notes: #1 Three subjects voted for the partner matching protocol and one subject voted for the random matching 
protocol. A majority rule was applied and the partner matching protocol was implemented in this group.  
#2 Two subjects voted for the partner matching protocol and the other two subjects voted for the random matching 
protocol. The computer broke the tie and the partner matching protocol was implemented in this group. 
#3 One subject voted for the partner matching protocol and three subjects voted for the random matching protocol in 
one of the two groups. A majority rule was applied and the random matching protocol was implemented in that 
group. In the other group, two subjects voted for the partner matching protocol and the other two subjects voted for 
the random matching protocol. The computer broke the tie and the partner matching protocol was implemented in 
this group. 
#4 Two subjects voted for the partner matching protocol and the other two subjects voted for the random matching 
protocol. The computer broke the tie and the partner matching protocol was implemented in this group. 
#5 Four subjects voted for the random matching protocol in the 20th voting stage in this group.   
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II. The Number of Supports for the Partner Matching Protocol in the ENDO-M treatment  
 
(a) Session 7 
The # of supports for the partner 
matching protocol 
1st SG 2nd SG 3rd SG 4th SG 5th SG 
0      
1    1 group  
2 1 group 1 group 4 groups 1 group 2 groups 
3 3 groups 4 groups 1 group 2 groups 2 groups 
4 1 group   1 group 1 group 
 
(b) Session 8 
The # of supports for the partner 
matching protocol 
1st SG 2nd SG 3rd SG 4th SG 5th SG 
0      
1   1 group   
2  3 groups  2 groups 2 groups 
3 3 groups 2 groups 3 groups 3 groups 1 group 
4 2 groups  1 group  2 groups 
 
(c) Session 9 
The # of supports for the partner 
matching protocol 
1st SG 2nd SG 3rd SG 4th SG 5th SG 
0      
1  1 group  1 group  
2  1 group  2 groups 1 group 
3 2 group 2 groups 4 groups 1 group 4 groups 
4 4 groups 2 groups 2 groups 2 groups 1 group 
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Table C.2: The Effects of Democratic Decision-Making on Enhancing Cooperation 
(supplementing Table 3 of the paper) – Robustness check 1 
 
       
Voting rule: Unanimity Rule Majority Rule 
Data: 1st Supergame All Supergames 1st Supergame All Supergames 
Period: Round 1 Round 1 Rounds 1-3 Round 1 Round 1 Rounds 1-3 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
(i) Endo dummy {= 1 for the 
ENDO-U and the ENDO-M 
treatments; 0 for the EXO 
treatment} 
.28*** 
(.076) 
.48*** 
(.16) 
.44*** 
(.12) 
.45*** 
(.11) 
.72*** 
(.23) 
.82*** 
(.27) 
       
(ii) Supergame number {= 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5}  
--- 
-.16*** 
(.022) 
-.15*** 
(.024) 
--- 
-.15*** 
(.024) 
-.14*** 
(.027) 
       
Interaction term:  
(i)  (ii) 
--- 
-.046 
(.088) 
.042 
(.052) 
--- 
-.056 
(.076) 
-.073 
(.085) 
       
(iii) Rounds within 
supergames {=1, 2, 3} 
--- --- 
-.25*** 
(.039) 
--- --- 
-.24*** 
(.038) 
       
Interaction term: 
(i)  (iii) 
--- --- 
-.22*** 
(.058) 
--- --- 
-.084** 
(.036) 
       
       
# of observations 128 620 1452 128 592 1,428 
Log likelihood  -288.5 -1380.5 -3276.5 -272.0 -1326.9 -3791.1 
       
 
Notes: Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Individual random effects are 
included except for columns (1) and (4). Observations only in groups that operated under the partner matching 
protocol were used. The observations from the ENDO-U and EXO treatments were used for columns (1) to (3), 
while the observations from the ENDO-M and EXO treatments were used for columns (4) to (6). The dependent 
variable is contribution amount of subject i in a given round of a given supergame. The numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors. Cut points are omitted to conserve space. 
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
Result: Estimation results in Table 3 are robust. Specifically,  
(a) the impact of democracy: the Endo dummy has a significantly positive coefficient for every 
specification;  
(b) trends across supergames: the impact of democracy is consistently observed across the 
supergames, whether the unanimity or majority rule is used [see the interaction term between 
variables (i) and (ii) – the impact does not differ by supergame.];  
(c) trends within supergames: the impact of democracy largely persists within supergames when the 
majority rule is used (the ENDO-M treatment), whereas it diminishes from round to round within 
supergames when the unanimity rule is used (the ENDO-U treatment).42     
                                                          
42 The coefficient estimate of the interaction term between variables (i) and (iii) is significantly negative in column 
(6), but the size is only around one-tenth (10%) of the coefficient estimate of the Endo dummy. 
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Table C.3: The Effects of Democratic Decision-Making on Enhancing Cooperation 
(supplementing Table 3 of the paper) – Robustness check 2  
As mentioned in the paper, some groups did not unanimously agree on one protocol even in the 
final voting stage (voting stage 20). The following includes estimation results when excluding 
these groups from regressions in the ENDO-U treatment. 
[1. Results using tobit regressions] 
 
Dependent variable: Contribution amount of subject i in a given round of a given supergame 
 
    
Voting rule: Unanimity Rule 
Data: 1st Supergame All Supergames 
Period: Round 1 Round 1 Rounds 1-3 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
(i) Endo dummy {= 1 for the ENDO-U 
and the ENDO-M treatments; 0 for the 
EXO treatment} 
2.80*** 
(.85) 
3.03** 
(1.29) 
2.89*** 
(1.06) 
    
(ii) Supergame number  
{= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}  
--- 
-.90*** 
(.14) 
-.96*** 
(.13) 
    
Interaction term:  
(i)  (ii) 
--- 
-.25 
(.58) 
.36 
(.39) 
    
(iii) Rounds within  
supergames {=1, 2, 3} 
--- --- 
-2.13*** 
(.16) 
    
Interaction term: 
(i)  (iii) 
--- --- 
-1.21** 
(.50) 
    
Constant 9.44*** 
(.73) 
9.77 
(.44) 
11.8*** 
(.49) 
    
# of observations 124 604 1420 
# of left-censored observations 14 120 392 
# of right-censored observations 28 98 159 
Log likelihood  -346.8 -1668.2 -3755.8 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Observations only in groups that operated 
under the partner matching protocol were used. Groups that did not reach a unanimous agreement in the 20th vote were 
excluded from the regressions. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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[2. Results using ordered probit regressions] 
 
Dependent variable: Contribution amount of subject i in a given round of a given supergame 
 
    
Voting rule: Unanimity Rule 
Data: 1st Supergame All Supergames 
Period: Round 1 Round 1 Rounds 1-3 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
(i) Endo dummy {= 1 for the ENDO-U 
and the ENDO-M treatments; 0 for the 
EXO treatment} 
.34*** 
(.10) 
.43** 
(.21) 
.33*** 
(.11) 
    
(ii) Supergame number  
{= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}  
--- 
-.16*** 
(.022) 
-.15*** 
(.024) 
    
Interaction term:  
(i)  (ii) 
--- 
-.0083 
(.13) 
.098 
(.075) 
    
(iii) Rounds within  
supergames {=1, 2, 3} 
--- --- 
-.25*** 
(.038) 
    
Interaction term: 
(i)  (iii) 
--- --- 
-.23*** 
(.060) 
    
    
# of observations 124 604 1420 
Log likelihood  -280.7 -1348.8 -3221.1 
    
 
 
 
Notes: Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Individual random effects were 
included in columns (2) and (3). Observations only in groups that operated under the partner matching protocol were used. 
Groups that did not reach a unanimous agreement in the 20th vote were excluded from the regressions. The numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors. Cut points are omitted to conserve space. 
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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Table C.4: The Effects of Democratic Decision-Making on Enhancing Cooperation 
(supplementing Table 3 of the paper) – Robustness check 3: controlling for possible selection 
effects 
One group in each of the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments selected the random matching 
protocol in the 1st supergame (Table 1). These specific groups may be the ones with the lowest 
cooperative dispositions. If this is the case, the result for the impact of democracy in Table 3 and 
Appendix Table C.2 might be overestimated. As a robustness check, I conducted regressions 
with the same specifications as columns (1) and (4) of Table 3 and Appendix Table C.2, while 
dropping one group with the lowest average round 1 contribution in the EXO treatment. The 
estimation results are as follows: 
 
 
[1. Results using tobit regressions (Robustness check of Table 3)] 
 
Dependent variable: Contribution amount of subject i in round 1 of the 1st supergame 
 
   
Voting rule: Unanimity Rule Majority Rule 
Independent Variable: (1) (4) 
   
   
(i) Endo dummy {= 1 for the 
ENDO-U and the ENDO-M 
treatments; 0 for the EXO 
treatment} 
1.79*** 
(.32) 
4.51*** 
(.89) 
   
Constant 10.1*** 
(.25) 
10.2*** 
(.33) 
   
# of observations 124 124 
# of left-censored observations 14 17 
# of right-censored observations 29 38 
Log pseudo likelihood  -345.8 -322.7 
   
 
 
 
Notes: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. The numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors. Observations only in groups that operated under the partner matching protocol in the first supergame 
were used.  
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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[2. Results using ordered probit regressions (Robustness check of Appendix Table C.2)] 
 
Dependent variable: Contribution amount of subject i in round 1 of the 1st supergame 
 
   
Voting rule: Unanimity Rule Majority Rule 
Independent Variable: (1) (4) 
   
   
(i) Endo dummy {= 1 for the 
ENDO-U and the ENDO-M 
treatments; 0 for the EXO 
treatment} 
.22*** 
(.032) 
.39*** 
(.088) 
# of observations 124 124 
Log pseudo likelihood  -278.1 -260.1 
   
 
 
Notes: Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. The numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors. Observations only in groups that operated under the partner matching protocol in the first supergame 
were used. Cut points are omitted to conserve space as in Table C.2. 
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
RESULT: The results in the 1st supergame (Table 3 and Appendix Table C.2) are not inflated by 
possible selection bias. 
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Likewise, I conducted a robustness check of columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) of Table 3 of the paper and 
Table C.2 in the Appendix.  
One group, one group, five groups, two groups and one group in the ENDO-U treatment selected the 
random matching protocol in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th supergames, respectively (see Table 1 of the 
paper). Likewise, one group, three groups, three groups, six groups and four groups in the ENDO-M 
treatment selected the random matching protocol in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th supergames, 
respectively. These specific groups may be the ones with the lowest cooperative dispositions. If this 
is the case, the results from columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) of Table 3 and Appendix Table C.2 might be 
overestimated for the impact of democracy.  
As a robustness check, I conducted regressions with the same specifications as columns (2), (3), (5) 
and (6) of Table 3 and Appendix Table C.2 while dropping the observations of the same number of 
groups with the lowest average round 1 contributions in a given supergame from the EXO treatment. 
The following includes estimation results: 
[1. Results using tobit regressions (Robustness check of Table 3)] 
Dependent variable: Contribution amount of subject i in a given round of a given supergame 
 
     
Voting rule: Unanimity Rule Majority Rule 
Period: Round 1 Rounds 1-3 Round 1 Rounds 1-3 
Independent Variable: (2) (3) (5) (6) 
     
     
(i) Endo dummy {= 1 for the 
ENDO-U and the ENDO-M 
treatments; 0 for the EXO 
treatment} 
2.41** 
(1.06) 
2.55* 
(1.50) 
4.53*** 
(1.20) 
5.72** 
(2.43) 
     
(ii) Supergame number  -.88*** -.93 -.56*** -.59*** 
{= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} (.056) (.23) (.068) (.087) 
     
Interaction term:  
(i)  (ii) 
-.43 
(.47) 
.031 
(.39) 
-.81** 
(.41) 
-.98 
(.66) 
     
(iii) Rounds within supergames  
{= 1, 2, 3} 
--- 
-2.28*** 
(.20) 
--- 
-2.27*** 
(.34) 
     
Interaction term:  
(i)  (iii) 
--- 
-1.02* 
(.55) 
--- 
-.22 
(.50) 
     
Constant 10.5***  
(.24) 
12.5*** 
(.91) 
10.1*** 
(.21) 
12.0*** 
(.41) 
     
# of observations 580 1,356 524 1,240 
# of left-censored observations 112 377 95 298 
# of right-censored observations 98 158 105 193 
Log pseudo likelihood  -1604.1 -3579.8 -1434.7 -3315.5 
     
 
Notes: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Observations only in groups that 
operated under the partner matching protocol in the first supergame were used.  
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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[2. Results using ordered probit regressions (Robustness check of Appendix Table C.2)] 
Dependent variable: Contribution amount of subject i in a given round of a given supergame 
 
 
     
Voting rule: Unanimity Rule Majority Rule 
Period: Round 1 Rounds 1-3 Round 1 Rounds 1-3 
Independent Variable: (2) (3) (5) (6) 
     
     
(i) Endo dummy {= 1 for the 
ENDO-U and the ENDO-M 
treatments; 0 for the EXO 
treatment} 
.45*** 
(.17) 
.39*** 
(.13) 
.74*** 
(.24) 
.83*** 
(.26) 
     
(ii) Supergame number  -.15*** -.14*** -.098*** -.091*** 
{= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} (.017) (.027) (.012) (.022) 
     
Interaction term:  
(i)  (ii) 
-.056 
(.087) 
.036 
(.054) 
-.10 
(.074) 
-.12 
(.083) 
     
(iii) Rounds within 
supergames  
{= 1, 2, 3} 
--- 
-.26*** 
(.043) 
--- 
-.24*** 
(.050) 
     
Interaction term:  
(i)  (iii) 
--- 
-.21*** 
(.062) 
--- 
-.075 
(.050) 
     
# of observations 580 1,356 524 1,240 
Log pseudo likelihood  -1303.2 -3081.0 -1174.9 -2865.0 
     
 
Notes: Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Individual random effects are 
included. Observations only in groups that operated under the partner matching protocol in each supergame were 
used. Cut points are omitted to conserve space. 
 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
RESULT: The results in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) of Table 3 and Appendix Table C.2 are not 
inflated by possible selection bias.  
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Table C.5: The Effects of Democratic Decision-Making on the Formation of Subjects’ Beliefs 
(supplementing Table 5 of the paper) 
Dependent variable: Subject i’s belief on his or her three interaction partners’ average 
contribution amount in a given supergame 
 
     
Voting rule: Unanimity Rule Majority Rule 
Data: 1st Supergame All Supergames 1st Supergame All Supergames 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
(i) Endo dummy {= 1 for the 
ENDO-U and the ENDO-M 
treatments; 0 for the EXO 
treatment} 
.30** 
(.13) 
.31 
(.21) 
.43** 
(.20) 
.33 
(.31) 
     
(ii) Supergame number 
--- 
-.29*** --- -.23*** 
{= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} (.043)  (.038) 
     
Interaction term:  
(i)  (ii) 
--- 
-.041 
(.065) 
--- 
.015 
(.099) 
     
     
# of observations 128 620 128 592 
Log Pseudo likelihood  -283.9 -1488.3 -281.6 -1480.0 
     
 
 
 
Notes: Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Individual random effects are 
included in columns (2) and (4). As for the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments, only observations in groups which 
selected the partner matching protocol were used. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Cut points are 
omitted to conserve space. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Table C.6: The Effects of Democratic Decision-Making by the Number of Voting Stages 
Required to Reach a Consensus in the ENDO-U treatment, and by the Number of Y-voters in the 
ENDO-M treatment (supplementing Figure 2 of the paper) 
 
(1) Testing the differences in the average contribution between the ENDO-U and EXO treatments 
 Data for round 1 Data for rounds 1 to 3 
 1st SG All SG1 All SG1 
# of voting stages = 1 .004*** .023** .099* 
# of voting stages = 2 .076* .161 .306 
# of voting stages {3, 4,… , 19} .241 .351 .552 
# of voting stages = 20 .000### .000### .000### 
 
Notes: Two-sided p-values based on tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Each test 
compares the average contributions of groups that operated under the partner matching protocol between the ENDO-
U and EXO treatments. See Panel (I) in Figure 2 of the paper for the average contribution amounts.  
 1 Individual random effects were additionally included for these regressions. 
*, **, and *** indicate that the average contribution is significantly larger in the ENDO-U treatment than in the 
EXO treatment at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
#, ##, and ### indicate that the average contribution is significantly lower in the ENDO-U treatment than in the EXO 
treatment at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
(2) Testing the differences in the average contribution between the ENDO-M and EXO treatments 
 Data for round 1 Data for rounds 1 to 3 
 1st SG All SG1 All SG1 
# of Y-voters = 4 .000*** .000*** .000*** 
# of Y-voters = 3 .440 .001*** .012** 
# of Y-voters = 2 N/A .329 .052* 
 
Notes: Two-sided p-values based on tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Each test 
compares the average contributions of groups that operated under the partner matching protocol between the ENDO-
M and EXO treatments. See Panel (II) in Figure 2 of the paper for the average contribution amounts.  
 1 Individual random effects were additionally included for these regressions. 
*, **, and *** indicate that the average contribution is significantly larger in the ENDO-M treatment than in the 
EXO treatment at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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[The next two tables include results for statistical tests of the differences in beliefs:] 
 
 
(3) Testing the differences in the average belief between the ENDO-U and EXO treatments 
 
 1st SG All SG1 
# of voting stages = 1 .070* .145 
# of voting stages = 2 .080* .058* 
# of voting stages {3, 4,… , 19} .304 .907 
# of voting stages = 20 .036** .176 
 
 
Notes: Two-sided p-values based on tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Each test 
compares the average beliefs of groups that operated under the partner matching protocol between the ENDO-U and 
EXO treatments. See Panel (I) in Figure 2 of the paper for the average beliefs in the ENDO-U and EXO treatments.  
1 Individual random effects were additionally included for these regressions. 
*, **, and *** indicate that the average belief is significantly larger in the ENDO-U treatment than in the EXO 
treatment at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
  
 
(4) Testing the differences in the average belief between the ENDO-M and EXO treatments 
 Data for round 1 
 1st SG All SG1 
# of Y-voters = 4 .000*** .000*** 
# of Y-voters = 3 .659 .113 
# of Y-voters = 2 N/A .794 
 
Notes: Two-sided p-values based on tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Each test 
compares the average beliefs of groups that operated under the partner matching protocol between the ENDO-M and 
EXO treatments. See Panel (II) in Figure 2 of the paper for the average beliefs in the ENDO-M and EXO treatments.  
1 Individual random effects were additionally included for these regressions. 
*, **, and *** indicate that the average belief is significantly larger in the ENDO-M treatment than in the EXO 
treatment at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Table C.7: The Effects of Experiences on Voting under the Partner Matching Protocol 
 
Dependent variable: A dummy which equals 1 if subject i voted for the partner matching 
protocol in the tth supergame; and 0 if the subject voted for the random matching protocol. 
 
   
Independent Variable: 
ENDO-
U 
(1) 
ENDO-
M 
(2) 
   
   
(Average realized contribution by 𝑖′s group members in Supergame 𝑡 –  1) 
/(Subject 𝑖′s belief on peers′contribution amounts in Supergame 𝑡 –  1) 
.069 
(.039) 
.14*** 
(.012) 
   
Constant .65*** 
(.042) 
.57*** 
(.012) 
   
# of observations 215 198 
Prob > F .2224 .0073*** 
   
 
Notes: Linear probability models. Standard errors, clustered by session ID, were in parenthesis. Individual fixed 
effects were included to control for time-invariant individual heterogeneity. Observations in groups that operated 
under the partner matching protocol in the t – 1th supergame were used. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
 
